"Hit It Hard From The Yard": Wise Or Wimps?

[FFPCogs 863]

I think that is the real crux of this. We're looking at a very small piece that came out of these research burns. The research really starts with scientifically (and importantly- repeatable methodology) showing the changes/clarifications in our fire environment on numerous fronts: building contents/fuel load that result in dramatically faster heat release rates (HRR), the building itself, and the effects of all ventilation (not just as a specifically employed tactic) on the fire and conditions within the structure.

We're getting stuck on one small item that has been identified as a way to address these faster HRR's that cause untenable conditions sooner, in structures that due to new building practices may fail so much faster it almost coincides with FD arrival. Failure to understand that fires in buildings are changing as opposed to the ones that much of our previous tactics were born from. This is not in anyway to say we've got to start from scratch, this means we need to adjust where tactically necessary based on understanding our "workplace" better.

There is a ton of information out there, and I've read, heard, discussed, seen, and tried a lot, of which was likely just a scratch on the surface. But in that time, I've yet to see anyone participating in the research advocate fighting all fires from the exterior. The only people saying this are really people immediately pushing back against change, anticipating the "Safety Sally's" are taking over and telling us interior attack is too dangerous. The only legitimate tactic that I've seen recommended by any credible source has been employing an exterior stream to quickly reduce the energy from a venting fire. This appears to have come from NIST's research showing that properly employed, the stream will not push fire or steam viable occupants to death, removing those concerns that often prevented us from doing this before. There are specific parameters for employing this tactic (when, where, how) and also very often noted that it should not cause noticeable delay in the initial interior stretch.

Reducing the heat in the interior, where applicable, is not because firefighters are becoming "wimpy" but in fact, because they recognize that the risks to occupants and firefighters alike continue to grow as heat rises. We now know that if the temp is "X" right now, it will likely grow as soon as we open the front door to take that first line in, and continue to rise sharply until we get water on the fire. Having given the same fire a quick shot of water, we may be able to move in to the seat faster. This should be the goal, remove the energy to speed our path to the seat of the fire, not to extinguish the fire from the yard.

Very erudite and well presented response that for the most part I agree with. This tactic like all tactics has it's place and being educated on the dieferent tools at our disposal and when to use them should never be frowned upon. That said I do though take exception to this one sentence as I have personally experienced quite a different view:

The only people saying this are really people immediately pushing back against change, anticipating the "Safety Sally's" are taking over and telling us interior attack is too dangerous.

As most know I spent a number of years doing contract firefighting overseas and in that capacity I worked with FF's from all over the U.S. and now Europe. Like FF's everywhere, we overseas engaged in tactical discussions frequently and at times even heatedly, especially when talking about aggressive interior operations. When I started back in 2004 there were probably 2 or 3 members out of 20 who advocated the "hitting it from the yard" tactic as THE primary means of attacking the average structure fire, specifically because they were taught and honestly believed that an "interior attack is too dangerous" in modern firefighting...their words not mine. Their departments made the conscious decision to change their fundamental strategy to an initial exterior attack every time at every fire as policy and justified that change by citing firefighter safety. Fast forward to 2015 and the number of my colleagues who come from departments that adhere to this principle has quadrupled to over a dozen or more, paid, volunteer and military out of 30. These are FFs from widely disparate departments ranging from North Carolina to Oregon, Indiana to Alabama and a host of places in between. They didn't know each other before being assigned to the base nor did their departments work together, the only thing they have in common is a taught belief that ""interior attack is too dangerous". The point being, the "push back " is not based on some kind of irrational fear of change, but rather resistance to a "one size fits all" "use this tactic always" philosophy that, in my personal experience anyway, seems to be spreading through the American fire service.

[Morningjoe 162]

The main issue here is that everyone is comparing FDNY's tactics, to their own and others. If your department can place 4 fully staffed engines, 3 full staffed ladders, a fully staffed rescue, 2 battalion chiefs on location, all trained to FDNY's minimum training standards, then by all means, compare away. FDNY's guys arrive on scene and each member basically has 1 function to perform... and that's it. 99.99% of other departments, when you arrive, are going to be expected to multitask and call audibles on the fly.

However, most of us are showing up with less then the NFPA's required 16 personnel for a single family residential home (2,000 sqft) within the first 8 minutes. That doesn't even account for larger McMansions or even high rise or OMDs. Each department must look at their manpower on any given moment, and make prudent tactical decisions based off of the situation that has been presented at that very moment.

Showing up with 2 guys and no officer on the first due engine, with no confirmed reports or identifying signs of people inside? Stretch your handline, IF NEEDED, give it a quick shot before you mask up, make entry and perform an aggressive interior attack, while your backup man and or second due companies search off the line.

Same staffing, but with confirmed reports of people trapped with a known location? Life above all else. Mask up, and either perform a normal search, or VES the area where the victim is expected to be.

Basement fire? Whats the harm of popping the bilco door, or venting a small basement window and giving it a quick shot, and allow the gasses to vent and cool, and maybe flash BEFORE you make entry and flash on you and your crew.

To sit here and say that every situation should require transitional (which, btw, is just a fancy name for a task that has been employed since the dawn of firefighting with a new fancy buzz name now) or strictly aggressive interior, or defensive attack, is ludicrous. Proper training, and knowledge of situational awareness and the ability to properly apply each individual tactic and strategy appropriately is what we should be discussing.

I highly recommend people read "Suburban Fire Tactics," by Jim Silvernail. He addresses issues that minimally staffed departments around the country face everyday, and goes over tactics and strategies to bring back and apply to your departments as necessary. Here is a fire engineering article he wrote that discusses some of the aforementioned points, and a link to purchase his book:

http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-164/issue-3/features/suburban-fire-tactics-prioritizing-functions-and-developing-preferred-operating-methods.html

https://books.google.com/books/about/Suburban_Fire_Tactics.html?id=QYDAxE_8e_QC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false

[antiquefirelt 994]

That said I do though take exception to this one sentence as I have personally experienced quite a different view:

When I started back in 2004 there were probably 2 or 3 members out of 20 who advocated the "hitting it from the yard" tactic as THE primary means of attacking the average structure fire, specifically because they were taught and honestly believed that an "interior attack is too dangerous" in modern firefighting...their words not mine. Their departments made the conscious decision to change their fundamental strategy to an initial exterior attack every time at every fire as policy and justified that change by citing firefighter safety. Fast forward to 2015 and the number of my colleagues who come from departments that adhere to this principle has quadrupled to over a dozen or more, paid, volunteer and military out of 30. These are FFs from widely disparate departments ranging from North Carolina to Oregon, Indiana to Alabama and a host of places in between. They didn't know each other before being assigned to the base nor did their departments work together, the only thing they have in common is a taught belief that ""interior attack is too dangerous". The point being, the "push back " is not based on some kind of irrational fear of change, but rather resistance to a "one size fits all" "use this tactic always" philosophy that, in my personal experience anyway, seems to be spreading through the American fire service.

I stand corrected, I should refrain from the use of the words "always, never, and only" as they often are too restrictive when applied to opinions and commentary.

I guess I've not been exposed to very many firefighters who believe that "all defensive" is right or where we're heading. I have seen some arguments made that in some cases it is felt that new construction dictates a far less aggressive approach or almost a defensive unless rescue approach, but typically limited to new lightweight constructed unprotected residential structures. I think these also focus on too narrow a view of research. There is no way we can apply a one tactic fits all approach, not even to a particular structure. We need to instead be better at size-up, understanding how fire grows and spreads, appropriate tactics and the proper time and place for each tactic. Ultimately, I think we'll find that those who believe in the all one way or predominantly defensive approach will not prevail, as the American Fire Service still appears to attract mostly type "A" people who anticipate having to extend greater risk for others is part of the job. Not reckless risk, but more than the average person. Fires, buildings and human behavior is far too dynamic for a one size fits all approach.

[antiquefirelt 994]

Same staffing, but with confirmed reports of people trapped with a known location? Life above all else. Mask up, and either perform a normal search, or VES the area where the victim is expected to be.

Sometimes, even in this scenario, putting water on the fire may be the best initial action. In our FD, we heavily refer to the 5 Basic Concepts laid out in Chapter 1 of the Fire Officer's Handbook of Tactics:

1. When proper manpower isn't available to do both rescue and extinguishment at the same time, rescue must be given priority.

2. When you don't have sufficient manpower to perform all the need tasks, perform those first that protect the greatest number of lives.

3. Remove those in greatest danger first.

4. When you have the staffing to do both rescue and fire attack at the same time, they must be coordinated.

5. Where there is no threat to occupants, firefighters lives should not be unduly endangered.

Again, understanding the conditions you face, the actual time to effect the rescue and a the likely challenges facing a "rescue only" approach may indicate that controlling the fire is the most appropriate first action. How imminent is the threat to the know rescue? Will you be able to make it? Will your actions make conditions worse such that an unsuccessful attempt will seal the victims fate? There is no one answer, except hoping the person making the decision at that moment is at the top of their game.

Edited November 21, 2015 by antiquefirelt

[Morningjoe 162]

Sometimes, even in this scenario, putting water on the fire may be the best initial action. In our FD, we heavily refer to the 5 Basic Concepts laid out in Chapter 1 of the Fire Officer's Handbook of Tactics:

1. When proper manpower isn't available to do both rescue and extinguishment at the same time, rescue must be given priority.

2. When you don't have sufficient manpower to perform all the need tasks, perform those first that protect the greatest number of lives.

3. Remove those in greatest danger first.

4. When you have the staffing to do both rescue and fire attack at the same time, they must be coordinated.

5. Where there is no threat to occupants, firefighters lives should not be unduly endangered.

Again, understanding the conditions you face, the actual time to effect the rescue and a the likely challenges facing a "rescue" only approach may indicate that controlling the fire is the most appropriate first action. How imminent is the threat to the know rescue? Will you be able to make it? Will your actions make conditions worse such that an unsuccessful attempt will seal the victims fate? There is no one answer, except hoping the person making the decision at that moment is at the top of their game.

This is exactly what I was trying to convey, but just laid a very simple non-descriptive scenario out there, and I should have been more specific.

[antiquefirelt 994]

One of the hang-ups I have is calling the "resetting the fire" exterior stream hit: "Transitional Attack". Transitional attack has been a term that far predates any of this recent UL/NIST research. many fire service authors have written text in many well worn books describing Transitional Attack as employing one mode of attack while preparing for another. Such as cautiously sending in the first line to the interior while preparing for it to be ineffective by deploying defensive lines should the need to retreat be necessary. Or, conversely, using a master stream to knockdown an appreciable amount of visible fire before committing to the interior. In fact, a quick search shows that NFPA and IAFC defined "Transitional Attack" long ago and the current recommendation of the exterior fire stream fails to meet their definition on a few fronts.

In my view, the proper employment of the exterior stream should and will become just another step among those employed during a direct attack (offensive). Sometimes this step will be indicated, others times it will not, but it will not in and of itself, be a true mode of attack and thus should not be so named as to elevate its emphasis too greatly. Ultimately, I think this terminology leads to some of the skeptism as firefighters see us "abandoning the offensive attack for a transitional one", which really does not describe what is really indicated. We're merely indicating a "new" step along the way to the seat of the fire that will reduce temp's and speed our ability to get to the seat. At no time should this be taken to mean stop at the outside stream step and flow until the fire only needs mop up.