2 In/2 Out Rule And How It is Interpetted

[x635 4,066]

OK, so we all know about the 2 in/2 out rule.

However, surveying some local agencies surprised me. Some consider 2 certified interior firefighters with 2 exterior-only firefighters as sufficient. Some considered the IC and having three interior firefighters. And some consider the pump operator as an interior firefighter, all used to get around the policy (law?). Is it correct for me to consider it to means 2 (or more) interior qualified inside, and 2 (or equivalent) qualified interior firefighters ready to go outside?

Also, can you factor in units that are enroute to count towards this and go in assuming they will make it to the scene? This obviously wouldn't be prudent.

How is adherence to this policy monitored and enforced, on both the local, state, and federal levels?

[Dinosaur 844]

The problem is it is generally enforced retroactively - after something bad happens. You can get away with it until someone gets hurt, or worse, and then they will be under the microscope.

At issue isn't the interpretation but rather the underlying purpose of the regulation, which as I recall was to insure someone was there to rescue the crew if something happens in an IDLH environment. Saying that two exterior FF is enough for the two out is a trap. If something happens to the crew in the IDLH, the exterior crew either has to rescue them in violation of the regulation or not rescue them and leave them to their fate.

I believe there are OSHA interpretations (really the only ones that count) that say the IC or pump operator can count toward the two out (if they're qualified) but think about that practically. A mayday is transmitted and the IC abandons command to become part of the rescue crew. Who will know what's going on or where the mayday is coming from? Who will know how many people are operating and where? There are so many problems with that strategy it isn't funny. Likewise the pump operator. He abandons his post and goes to rescue the crew only to find that more water is needed or another line needs to be charged by another crew. Bad plan!

The underlying problem is no standard for FF (outside of the career service) - at least in NYS - and no compliance with NFPA 1710 or 1720 to make sure enough qualified FF are on the scene.

[FireMedic049 597]

When you consider what the intent of the 2 in/2 out rule is, I would say that anybody who is counting non-interior qualified/capable personnel towards the 2 out are clearly fools.

As Dinosaur points out, the rule itself appears to ignore certain best practices for handling an incident, like the need for an IC and pump operator for situations the rule would apply to for the fire service.

The reality is that the rule is typically going to really only be a consideration during the initial stage of a fire response while additional units are still enroute.

As someone who's department has a minimum on duty staffing of 5 and had been as low as 4, it's certainly not ideal, but it is possible for the IC to man the pump and direct incoming units until additional personnel can arrive and take over that role.

Additionally, the 2 out is not going to be sufficient to perform a FF rescue in most cases.

So, it begs the question, depending on the situation at hand, is it better to initiate an interior fire attack (potentially halting the fire growth) with just your 2 in / 2 out or waiting until you have sufficient personnel to staff that plus an IC, a pump operator, etc., but allowing the fire to grow and potentially be "more dangerous" when the fire attack is initiated?

[FFPCogs 863]

I have a question, how many firefighters have died in the initial phases of an incident due to disregarding 2 in- 2 out?

I know roughly 100 of us die annually, but about 1/2 of those LODDs are vehicle accidents, heart attacks ect leaving the other 1/2 as actual fireground deaths due to the fire. Now I've been around awhile and I do my best to keep up on LODD reports and I can't really think of any incidents where disregarding the 2 in 2 out rule was a contributing factor. To the best of my knowledge (and I'll be the first to admit that my knowledge may be limited) the vast majority of fireground deaths have happened when a good number of FFs are on scene, operations are well under way and in most if not all cases a FAST was assembled and ready to go.

Personally I find the 2 in - 2 out rule to be overkill and another attempt to make things safer that ultimately makes them less safe.

Edited August 25, 2014 by FFPCogs

[FireMedic049 597]

I have a question, how many firefighters have died in the initial phases of an incident due to disregarding 2 in- 2 out?

I know roughly 100 of us die annually, but about 1/2 of those LODDs are vehicle accidents, heart attacks ect leaving the other 1/2 as actual fireground deaths due to the fire.

Now I've been around awhile and I do my best to keep up on LODD reports and I can't really think of any incidents where disregarding the 2 in 2 out rule was a contributing factor. To the best of my knowledge (and I'll be the first to admit that my knowledge may be limited) the vast majority of fireground deaths have happened when a good number of FFs are on scene, operations are well under way and in most if not all cases a FAST was assembled and ready to go.

I can't readily think of any LODDs attributable to not following 2 in/2 out. The closest incident that I can think of off hand is Keokuk, IA in 1999. It was a triple LODD in the very early stages of the incident, but even though the known rescue exception applied, they had enough to meet the rule. However, you can't solely look at LODDs regarding this. You have to consider line of duty injuries also, but I'm not sure if that type of information is readily available or even tracked in that context.

Personally I find the 2 in - 2 out rule to be overkill and another attempt to make things safer that ultimately makes them less safe.

One thing to keep in mind about the 2 in / 2 out rule is that it really wasn't written with the fire service response to building fires in mind. If I'm not mistaken, it written for hazmat related incidents.

I agree that the rule does have a limiting aspect to it that can make an incident "less safe" as I alluded to above. Sometimes, waiting for the right number of people to arrive and letting the fire grow is not the safest strategy.

[antiquefirelt 994]

To the best of my knowledge (and I'll be the first to admit that my knowledge may be limited) the vast majority of fireground deaths have happened when a good number of FFs are on scene, operations are well under way and in most if not all cases a FAST was assembled and ready to go.

Maybe we were way behind, but I don't remember FAST or RIT even being a "thing" until the 2 in/ 2 out rules came into affect. Before that we had back-up lines and "fresh crews", but personnel dedicated to rescuing our own on immediate stand-by? Nope. So while there may be some times we feel our hands are tied (or we're breaking the rules), it appears this is what it took for us to at least consider what it takes to save our own. We can't prove people would have died if they had ignored 2 in/ 2 out, but I bet we can find examples of members who have lived after being rescued by RIT/FAST?

Edited August 26, 2014 by antiquefirelt

[FirNaTine 370]

Id love to see a Stat on what caused a FAST/RIT Team to be deployed and could it have been prevented by FFs just learning and doing their Job to the best of their ability and using good common sense. Yes there will always be the unpredictable/unforeseen events that unfold at an Incident causing both death and serious injuries to members but how many times are these unfortunate outcomes caused by our own members, both directly and indirectly, thru poor Strategy/Tactics and piss poor decision making on ones part, no matter what their Rank is. As Ive said numerous times, we are our own worst enemy more so then often and are to quick to point fingers and blame to cover up our mistakes. JMO.

[FirNaTine 370]

So, it begs the question, depending on the situation at hand, is it better to initiate an interior fire attack (potentially halting the fire growth) with just your 2 in / 2 out or waiting until you have sufficient personnel to staff that plus an IC, a pump operator, etc., but allowing the fire to grow and potentially be "more dangerous" when the fire attack is initiated?

And as a result increasing everyones chances of getting injured or killed, and having to deploy your FAST/RIT Team instead of nipping it in the Butt! I believe they're some credibility to this point of view. JMO

[antiquefirelt 994]

Id love to see a Stat on what caused a FAST/RIT Team to be deployed and could it have been prevented by FFs just learning and doing their Job to the best of their ability and using good common sense.

Without a doubt this may be the case in many (most?) occurrences, but the incidents we go to rarely give us all the variables and therefore we must prepare for what might happen when we enter the wrong tactic for X or mistime a particular task. At worst using the common thinking on 2 in/2 out, they're saying that in the absence of a known rescue, you should have 6 personnel (IC, MPO, 2FF in, 2FF out) on scene before committing personnel to the interior fire area. Many of us are forced to modify that down to a smaller number and likely this is why we've not seen stronger language in defining the 2 out.

In the end we all know that we must consider the dangers of committing personnel to an interior firefight when there is no one readily available to assist them should something go wrong. Just having to weigh that decision vs. the old days of being halfway to the door before the brake was set likely has saved firefighters from injury or death.

As far as allowing firefighters to use their common sense? Their training? I think of so many threads here and on other forums and wonder if you really think that would work?

Edited August 26, 2014 by antiquefirelt

[antiquefirelt 994]

And as a result increasing everyones chances of getting injured or killed, and having to deploy your FAST/RIT Team instead of nipping it in the Butt! I believe they're some credibility to this point of view. JMO

You just have to move "the line". Where does the IDLH begin?

[FFPCogs 863]

As far as allowing firefighters to use their common sense? Their training? I think of so many threads here and on other forums and wonder if you really think that would work?

Actually yes I do think that it would work, because that's exactly what did work for the 200 years of American firefighting before the 2 in 2 out rule became the the rule. The idea of having members outside ready to assist is a good one, but it's not a new one, we just didn't give it a name years ago. Maybe if more emphasis was put on training guys to put the fire out instead of trying to regulate them to do everything but so they don't get a boo boo, we wouldn't be having this conversation. I've said it before I'll say it again, the surest way to make the fireground safe is to know how to do your job and the only way you learn how to do you job is by doing it. I will take safely aggressive over aggressively safe any day and I believe that those we serve are better served by that attitude, as is the fire service itself.

[SFRD372 43]

Why is there a debate at all? It clearly states that for every two certified firefighters who enter a structure to provide firefighting activities there SHALL be two certified firefighters outside to save them should conditions fail and they require a rescue. Plain and simple, period, not up for interpretation.......

[FireMedic049 597]

You just have to move "the line". Yup!

Where does the IDLH begin? Where the front apron meets the street.

[AFS1970 504]

The rule does not say that for EVERY 2 inside there needs to be 2 outside. If this were the case it would quickly turn into the 4/4, 10/10 or even 100/100 rule as an incident grew. This would mean almost no department in the world would be compliant. It does say that for any interior operation there have to be 2 outside ready to be deployed. Now this leads to the next bit of confusion.

In the fire service everyone loves to have battles over regulations. It is almost a national pastime. various government agencies (NFPA, OSHA, NIOSH) vie for supremacy and many departments try to see how far they can push adhering to the bare minimums. Sometimes this is a manpower issue, sometimes it is a budget issue and sometimes it is an old timer issue.

The 2 in / 2 out rule has it's roots in haz-mat not firefighting. I would also say it has some roots in scuba diving. But how we apply it (which was the original question) varies greatly.

I met some guys from a few departments in upstate CT a while back in a class. In their region they considered 2 in / 2 out and FAST to be completely separate animals. They described a typical response as Department A is primary they go out the door with whatever they have, let's say 2 guys on the first engine. Department B is sent mutual aid and also has 2 guys. This engine is the 2 out engine. They need to be on scene for the first engine to go to work. However Department C is also coming mutual aid, sometimes from more than a town away with a 4 man engine to be the FAST. They can be en route while operations are going on because the 2 out engine is there.

Now as this OSHA reg developed into RIT / FAST programs, we realized some things. Most career departments have 3 or 4 man crews that they do not split up. So the RIT in those departments will be more than 2. Departmetns that have had to deploy RIT have discovered that multiple teams will be needed. I think Phoenix is now sending 12 (3 rigs) but I may be mistaken. I took a class that was all RIT scenarios in a burn building lots of obsitcals. None of us were bale to rescue anyone with only 4 guys. Most RIT's ran out of air and risked becoming extra victims.

I would be tempted to say that based on this training 4 is not enough, but Pete brings up a good point in saying that not having a FAST in place does not seem to be that big a factor in LODD reports. I doubt the data is there but I would hazard a guess that having too small a RIT is not much of a factor either, except perhaps when there are multiple FF's that need to be rescued simultaneously. However in all cases FAST's get supplemented by other crews on scene.

As for counting those with other responsibilities or of lesser qualifications as the 2 out, this is very dangerous. As has been pointed out those tasks still need to be done. However I will use a SCUBA scenario to prove the point. Would you send two divers into the water, knowing that your 2 out were two line tenders that could not swim and had never used a respirator?

[Dinosaur 844]

I have a question, how many firefighters have died in the initial phases of an incident due to disregarding 2 in- 2 out?

I know roughly 100 of us die annually, but about 1/2 of those LODDs are vehicle accidents, heart attacks ect leaving the other 1/2 as actual fireground deaths due to the fire.

Now I've been around awhile and I do my best to keep up on LODD reports and I can't really think of any incidents where disregarding the 2 in 2 out rule was a contributing factor. To the best of my knowledge (and I'll be the first to admit that my knowledge may be limited) the vast majority of fireground deaths have happened when a good number of FFs are on scene, operations are well under way and in most if not all cases a FAST was assembled and ready to go.

I can't readily think of any LODDs attributable to not following 2 in/2 out. The closest incident that I can think of off hand is Keokuk, IA in 1999. It was a triple LODD in the very early stages of the incident, but even though the known rescue exception applied, they had enough to meet the rule. However, you can't solely look at LODDs regarding this. You have to consider line of duty injuries also, but I'm not sure if that type of information is readily available or even tracked in that context.

1. Personally I find the 2 in - 2 out rule to be overkill and another attempt to make things safer that ultimately makes them less safe.

2. One thing to keep in mind about the 2 in / 2 out rule is that it really wasn't written with the fire service response to building fires in mind. If I'm not mistaken, it written for hazmat related incidents.

3. I agree that the rule does have a limiting aspect to it that can make an incident "less safe" as I alluded to above. Sometimes, waiting for the right number of people to arrive and letting the fire grow is not the safest strategy.

1. Overkill? Really? Let's be serious now, if it weren't for OSHA's 2 in 2 out rule, we would still have some departments operating with NOBODY standing around outside (including the IC). Two people isn't enough to perform the rescue of a down firefighter so what are we saying, we don't need to have a contigency for that? Two people isn't enough to perform many tasks on the fireground for very long so we are going to wind up with a lot of unfit people after a bottle change or two.

2. It was written into the respiratory protection standard and has been interpreted to include structural firefighting. See: https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22711

3. On the subject of the right number of people, we still have no consensus on what that number is (see below) but I think we can all agree that if we are talking about fighting a fire with just four people (and are even debating their required qualifications (interior vs. exterior) we are completely missing the point. I don't care if it's a career department with inadequate staffing or a volunteer department that can't get the numbers to respond, we are setting people up for failure. And since our mantra is often "failure is not an option" what the hell are we doing? Even the international association of city managers cites minimum numbers but we still bicker and argue about it.

• NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, 20th edition (2008)⁴: recommends the following minimum numbers of firefighters/officers to do the job safely. If this sounds like a lot, keep in mind that firefighters will always work in pairs, if not more, to complete the several tasks to get the job done as safely as possible. This includes such tasks as water supply, search and rescue, ventilation, rapid intervention, and so on.

Between 19 and 23 personnel typically constitute the first-alarm assignment to a confirmed single-family dwelling fire, as observed by evaluation teams.

Not fewer than 24 firefighters and two chief officers, one or more safety officers, and a rapid intervention team(s) should respond to high-hazard occupancies (schools, hospitals, nursing homes, explosive plants, refineries, high-rise buildings, and other high-life hazard or occupancies with large fire potential).

Not fewer than 16 firefighters, one chief officer, a safety officer, and a rapid intervention team should respond to medium-hazard occupancies (apartments, offices, mercantile, and industrial occupancies not normally requiring extensive rescue or firefighting forces).

Not fewer than 14 firefighters, one chief officer, a safety officer, and a rapid intervention team should respond to low-hazard occupancies (one-, two-, or three-family dwellings and scattered small businesses and industrial occupancies).

At least 12 firefighters, one chief officer, a safety officer, and a rapid intervention team shall respond to rural alarms (scattered dwellings, small businesses, and a farm building).

• U.S. Fire Administration (USFA): recommends that a minimum of four firefighters respond on or with each apparatus.⁵

• The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC): advocates a minimum of five persons on engine and ladder companies. Noting that the reduction of members per unit and that the number of units has reached dangerously low levels, the IAFC says it would be “inappropriate” to accept or support further reductions.⁶

• The International City Management Association (ICMA): states in “Managing Fire Services” that at least four and often eight or more firefighters, each under the supervision of an officer, “should respond to fire suppression operations.” Further, it says, “If about 16 trained firefighters are not operating at the scene of a working fire within the critical time period, then dollar loss and injuries are significantly increased, as is fire spread.” It has found five-person companies 100-percent effective, four-person companies 65-percent effective, and three-person companies 38-percent effective.⁷

from: http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/volume-162/issue-8/features/fire-department-staffing-a-need-not-a-want.html

The bottom line is we still don't respond with enough FF initially and we don't stage reserve FF effectively for the duration, for contingencies or relief. Why is that?

[antiquefirelt 994]

You just have to move "the line". Yup!

Where does the IDLH begin? Where the front apron meets the street.

Sadly we have seen guys stepping off some trucks breathing air! I'd rather use the 2 in /2 out as a way to ensure I have better staffing then see it relaxed proving that we are willing to accept further reductions to our safety to appease some other project funding. Without hard fast rules and data I'm not sure how many of us will survive future cuts.

Most of the public bases what they think their FD needs based on the size of the community and the number of fires they see in the media. They have no clue how many firefighters it takes for just one of those fires. Less rules or more local variety will lead to many places seeing greater reductions or failure to bring their numbers to safe staffing levels. Not being able to comply with 2 in/ 2out is a lame excuse for failure to ensure proper staffing. The expectation level should be different between a VFD, a poorly staffed FD and a well staffed FD, but the one common thread is the FD spokespeople not telling the truth about their capabilities.

Maybe with a required minimum training for all responding firefighters, more still for company officers, yet even more for chief officers, maybe then we could allow those people to use their judgement (you know the ones who have been tested and vetted).

Edited August 26, 2014 by antiquefirelt

[FFPCogs 863]

Alot is being made here of proper staffing and I too agree that staffing should be a priority, but my comments are more directed at departments that use 2 in 2 out to justify not acting when action is necessary. One of the benefits of my particular kind of firefighting "career" is that I get to work with guys from just about everywhere and the fact is there are now departments that do NOT risk to save a life and they use 2 in and 2 out as one of the reasons for their inaction. It's not about showboating or being a cowboy or a tough guy, it's about doing what we are here to do when it counts...when lives are in the balance and there is a chance we can make the difference. Bottom line in my book, there is no excuse for not acting when someone's life is savable...period. It is my belief and my experience that 2 well trained, knowledgeable and safely aggressive firefighters can make the attempt to at the very least contain the fire to give those trapped a better chance at survival and they can do this based on all they know to make the judgement that the risk is worth it. Unfortunately it is also my experience that there are firefighters out there now (and maybe not here but they are out there) that are being trained that they should not act without "proper" staffing even if they could make the difference...and I'm sorry but that to me is completely contrary to our primary mission.

Edited August 26, 2014 by FFPCogs

[Dinosaur 844]

Alot is being made here of proper staffing and I too agree that staffing should be a priority, but my comments are more directed at departments that use 2 in 2 out to justify not acting when action is necessary. One of the benefits of my particular kind of firefighting "career" is that I get to work with guys from just about everywhere and the fact is there are now departments that do NOT risk to save a life and they use 2 in and 2 out as one of the reasons for their inaction. It's not about showboating or being a cowboy or a tough guy, it's about doing what we are here to do when it counts...when lives are in the balance and there is a chance we can make the difference. Bottom line in my book, there is no excuse for not acting when someone's life is savable...period. It is my belief and my experience that 2 well trained, knowledgeable and safely aggressive firefighters can make the attempt to at the very least contain the fire to give those trapped a better chance at survival and they can do this based on all they know to make the judgement that the risk is worth it. Unfortunately it is also my experience that there are firefighters out there now (and maybe not here but they are out there) that are being trained that they should not act without "proper" staffing even if they could make the difference...and I'm sorry but that to me is completely contrary to our primary mission.

Pete, I enjoy reading your input and you always post thought provoking comments. To your point, you asked about data to support the issue in an earlier post, now I ask you - do you have any statistics or cases where operating without minimum required personnel resulted in a loss of life or the opposite, where a crew effected a rescue without having the minimum staff required to operate?

[FFPCogs 863]

Pete, I enjoy reading your input and you always post thought provoking comments. To your point, you asked about data to support the issue in an earlier post, now I ask you - do you have any statistics or cases where operating without minimum required personnel resulted in a loss of life or the opposite, where a crew effected a rescue without having the minimum staff required to operate?

I do not on hand but I will endeavor to track some down.

What I do know is that on a number of occasions the actions of guys with only two or three on the crew (and thus no 2 out) did affect a significant reduction in property damage due to quick and aggressive action on well involved fires (multiple rooms)....including four cases off the top of my head which I myself was party to.

btw Dino I enjoy your thought provoking posts as well.

Edited August 26, 2014 by FFPCogs

[Dinosaur 844]

Posted in another thread here on EMTBravo, originally from the SecretList but it is certainly relevant to this discussion.

All,
We take time to remember and learn about the late Buffalo NY FD Lt Charles McCarthy, 45, and Jonathan Croom, 34 who died in the Line of Duty died while responding to an early morning structure fire on August 24, 2009. Lt. McCarthy was a 22-year veteran is survived by his wife, Terri, three children and a grandchild. FF Croom was a 10-year veteran and is survived by his infant child and his fiancée who was pregnant with their second child. RIP.

Key contributing factors identified in this double LODD include working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire; interior condition reports not communicated to command; inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments; and, crew integrity / accountability not maintained. Firefighter survival related changes sought by the families of Croom and McCarthy include:
* Following the "two in, two out rule," which means that firefighters do not enter or leave a burning structure without a partner.
* Having an accountability officer to keep track of firefighters entering and leaving "serious fires," freeing the commander at the scene to maintain an overview of the entire situation.
* Making numerous equipment enhancements such as upgraded radios, new self-contained breathing apparatus and thermal cameras.
Lack of an accountability officer and failure to enforce the "two in, two out rule" were cited in the lawsuits. Federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration work rules, adopted by New York State for the protection of first responders, were not adhered to. That allowed the families to sue, even though the job of firefighter has an assumption of risk.
One of the most troubling aspects of the deaths was that the BFD had lacked a standard operating procedure for extinguishing basement fires. That is now in place.


==ARTICLE ABOUT THE LAWSUITS FOLLOWING THIS LOSS BY FF FAMILY MEMBERS:
http://tinyurl.com/kzechaf

==BUFFALO FD REPORT:
http://tinyurl.com/8btssyx
==NIOSH REPORT:
http://www.cdc.gov/n...face200923.html
==VIDEO:
http://www.youtube.c...be_gdata_player
==MEDIA REPORTS / POST FIRE ACTION:
http://www.firefight...y/newsid/148634
Lots to learn so we can all honor their tragic loss.
Take Care. Be Careful. Pass It On.
BillyG
The Secret List 8/24/2014-2131 Hours
www.FireFighterCloseCalls.com

[FFPCogs 863]

Pete, I enjoy reading your input and you always post thought provoking comments. To your point, you asked about data to support the issue in an earlier post, now I ask you - do you have any statistics or cases where operating without minimum required personnel resulted in a loss of life or the opposite, where a crew effected a rescue without having the minimum staff required to operate?

Here's a video of what appears to be a rescue affected by 1 FF

http://www.statter911.com/2011/09/27/must-see-video-mogadore-ohio-house-fire-with-apparently-wo-rescued/

Edited August 26, 2014 by FFPCogs

[antiquefirelt 994]

Alot is being made here of proper staffing and I too agree that staffing should be a priority, but my comments are more directed at departments that use 2 in 2 out to justify not acting when action is necessary. One of the benefits of my particular kind of firefighting "career" is that I get to work with guys from just about everywhere and the fact is there are now departments that do NOT risk to save a life and they use 2 in and 2 out as one of the reasons for their inaction. It's not about showboating or being a cowboy or a tough guy, it's about doing what we are here to do when it counts...when lives are in the balance and there is a chance we can make the difference. Bottom line in my book, there is no excuse for not acting when someone's life is savable...period. It is my belief and my experience that 2 well trained, knowledgeable and safely aggressive firefighters can make the attempt to at the very least contain the fire to give those trapped a better chance at survival and they can do this based on all they know to make the judgement that the risk is worth it. Unfortunately it is also my experience that there are firefighters out there now (and maybe not here but they are out there) that are being trained that they should not act without "proper" staffing even if they could make the difference...and I'm sorry but that to me is completely contrary to our primary mission.

Kind of exactly the opposite point of view from which I was looking. We often see people finding any excuse to ignore 2 in/ 2 out. In fact my own FD for the first few years after it came out, regularly subscribed to "I think I hear something inside" as the excuse to continue to arrive with 2 or 3 guys and go right to work. Walk around? Rare to never. RIT? Not even a thought. Hell even having a pump operator meant someone was a p***&y. It was very common to arrive to find a pump wound up, one line stretched into a door and not a soul outside. As a combination FD the motto of the day was "get the equipment there and go to work, someone will show up to help". On a full staffed day with no other calls. we left the station with 5 firefighters on 4 pieces. We've slowly evolved and are far more responsible, but I won't deny you can see some of the past if you look hard enough. We still see other FD's around us that don't even give 2 in 2 out a thought, and RIT is just used to request another mutual aid engine who ends up with who knows what assignment.

As for FD's using 2 in/ 2 out as an excuse to limit their risk? Especially ignoring the documented exception for rescue? Unconscionable. I will say I keep reading about the growing number of departments that are using everything they can find (UL/NIST Studies and now 2 in /2 out) to become an outside exposure control department and find it hard to grasp, thankfully I've yet to see that kind of attitude in our area.

[FireMedic049 597]

FireMedic049, on 25 Aug 2014 - 9:50 PM, said:

FFPCogs, on 25 Aug 2014 - 08:29 AM, said:

I have a question, how many firefighters have died in the initial phases of an incident due to disregarding 2 in- 2 out?

I know roughly 100 of us die annually, but about 1/2 of those LODDs are vehicle accidents, heart attacks ect leaving the other 1/2 as actual fireground deaths due to the fire.

Now I've been around awhile and I do my best to keep up on LODD reports and I can't really think of any incidents where disregarding the 2 in 2 out rule was a contributing factor. To the best of my knowledge (and I'll be the first to admit that my knowledge may be limited) the vast majority of fireground deaths have happened when a good number of FFs are on scene, operations are well under way and in most if not all cases a FAST was assembled and ready to go.

I can't readily think of any LODDs attributable to not following 2 in/2 out. The closest incident that I can think of off hand is Keokuk, IA in 1999. It was a triple LODD in the very early stages of the incident, but even though the known rescue exception applied, they had enough to meet the rule. However, you can't solely look at LODDs regarding this. You have to consider line of duty injuries also, but I'm not sure if that type of information is readily available or even tracked in that context.

1. Personally I find the 2 in - 2 out rule to be overkill and another attempt to make things safer that ultimately makes them less safe.

2. One thing to keep in mind about the 2 in / 2 out rule is that it really wasn't written with the fire service response to building fires in mind. If I'm not mistaken, it written for hazmat related incidents.

3. I agree that the rule does have a limiting aspect to it that can make an incident "less safe" as I alluded to above. Sometimes, waiting for the right number of people to arrive and letting the fire grow is not the safest strategy.

1. Overkill? Really? Let's be serious now, if it weren't for OSHA's 2 in 2 out rule, we would still have some departments operating with NOBODY standing around outside (including the IC). Two people isn't enough to perform the rescue of a down firefighter so what are we saying, we don't need to have a contigency for that? Two people isn't enough to perform many tasks on the fireground for very long so we are going to wind up with a lot of unfit people after a bottle change or two.

Just to be clear, I wasn't the one who used the term "overkill" in regards to 2 in/2 out. I support the premise and goal of 2 in/2 out, but can also see situations in which the strict adherence to it creates a work environment that can be "more risky" to more people than the conditions initially encountered. It's an interesting paradox to consider.

I would venture a guess that we still have some departments conducting operations without meeting the rule, which is ridiculous. I would agree that 2 people isn't enough to perform a FF rescue.

I think we may not be on the same page here. I don't believe anybody is talking about trying to mitigate a working fire with only 3 or 4 people. Unless, I'm way off, we're talking about initial, first unit on the scene with more on the way operations. Ten minutes later we'll have 20 people there, but what is the impact of 2 in/2 out on initial operations when that first unit pulls up?

If we know there should be a dedicated IC and pump operator, then shouldn't the rule be 2 in/ 4 out?

If we know two people is not enough to effect the rescue of a downed firefighter, then shouldn't the rule be 2 in/ 12 out or 20 out?

Which brings us back to the question, if we wait for that right amount of people before initiating an interior fire attack, will the operating conditions actually be "safer" or will more people be at greater risk?

2. It was written into the respiratory protection standard and has been interpreted to include structural firefighting. See: https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22711

I know that it applies to structural firefighting, but as I stated, it is my understanding that it was written with hazmat operations in mind, not structural firefighting operations.

3. On the subject of the right number of people, we still have no consensus on what that number is (see below) but I think we can all agree that if we are talking about fighting a fire with just four people (and are even debating their required qualifications (interior vs. exterior) we are completely missing the point. I don't care if it's a career department with inadequate staffing or a volunteer department that can't get the numbers to respond, we are setting people up for failure. And since our mantra is often "failure is not an option" what the hell are we doing? Even the international association of city managers cites minimum numbers but we still bicker and argue about it.

As I mentioned above, I don't believe that we are talking about fighting fires with only 4 people.

The bottom line is we still don't respond with enough FF initially and we don't stage reserve FF effectively for the duration, for contingencies or relief. Why is that? I don't think you can effectively answer that question with any certainty unless talking about a specific department, there's too many possible variables otherwise.

[antiquefirelt 994]

One of the things about 2in/ 2out, is that we appear to be stuck on the two out being a RIT. We know, mostly from direct studies after the implementation of the rule that 2 out does not make a RIT.

If we stick to the exact 2 out, as the first rule came out without any "guidance" that speaks about the pump operator and IC, we are ensuring there are two trained and properly outfitted personnel to assist the two in the greatest danger with whatever they need. Of the two, the chances are that one will notice something bad happening and notify the inside crew is pretty decent, compared to no one. If something goes wrong at the pump, one can either correct it or tell the two in to get out. The two out can free lines, pull lines upon retreat, they can enter if a victim is found, they can be working toward a sustained water supply. Venting ahead of the attack crew? There are numerous tasks that the 2 out can perform that help ensure the two in come out. With no one outside, many more things can go wrong.

We can continually "what if" the situation to show that 2 out isn't close to enough, but does that make the answer: Why Bother? 2 in 2 out stopped departments from continuing dangerous practices of committing all first due personnel to the interior, while pump operators and IC's (if they were present) were in street clothes greatly limiting their effectiveness to react to most problems the interior forces got into. A much better line of questioning might be how to safely and effectively use a minimal crew while still having a positive effect on the actual problem. If it is taking many minutes after the first arriving personnel are on scene for second due units to arrive, maybe it's time to look at the response system?

Edited August 27, 2014 by antiquefirelt

[FFPCogs 863]

Firemedic is correct, I think we are not on the same page or there is a misunderstanding. My original post in which I stated 2 in 2 out was overkill was in reference to the initial phase of an incident, that first few minutes when 2 firefighters CAN make a difference if they are free to act and do so. In subsequent posts I noted a few of my own experiences where such action did make a difference in "violation" of the rule along with a video which shows just what a few guys can do under the right circumstances by relying on their own training, experience and wits. To be fair though 2 in 2 out can be circumvented in the event of an imminent threat to life, so the actions of the crew in the video were not a violation of the law and I trust if any of us were in a similar situation we would do just as they did. And let me be clear in case I misrepresented my view, I have not, I do not and I will not ever advocate undertaking anything without adequate personnel, other than initial actions to save life or under certain circumstance property. I do not know where the notion of 3 or 4 guys handling an entire job by themselves comes from, but I for one have never advocated for that. I think FAST is a great and useful concept which should be present at every fire and in light of that the skills to accomplish that mission should be incorporated regularly into every firefighters training. What I do have a problem with is the idea that the fireground can be regulated to make it "safe" and this is based in the simple fact that the fireground is a dynamic and ever changing environment where flexibility and the freedom to act immediately, using one's own knowledge, experience, training and intuition, is imperative.

[Dinosaur 844]

Firemedic is correct, I think we are not on the same page or there is a misunderstanding. My original post in which I stated 2 in 2 out was overkill was in reference to the initial phase of an incident, that first few minutes when 2 firefighters CAN make a difference if they are free to act and do so. In subsequent posts I noted a few of my own experiences where such action did make a difference in "violation" of the rule along with a video which shows just what a few guys can do under the right circumstances by relying on their own training, experience and wits. To be fair though 2 in 2 out can be circumvented in the event of an imminent threat to life, so the actions of the crew in the video were not a violation of the law and I trust if any of us were in a similar situation we would do just as they did. And let me be clear in case I misrepresented my view, I have not, I do not and I will not ever advocate undertaking anything without adequate personnel, other than initial actions to save life or under certain circumstance property. I do not know where the notion of 3 or 4 guys handling an entire job by themselves comes from, but I for one have never advocated for that. I think FAST is a great and useful concept which should be present at every fire and in light of that the skills to accomplish that mission should be incorporated regularly into every firefighters training. What I do have a problem with is the idea that the fireground can be regulated to make it "safe" and this is based in the simple fact that the fireground is a dynamic and ever changing environment where flexibility and the freedom to act immediately, using one's own knowledge, experience, training and intuition, is imperative.

I don't think we're on different pages. I think we're just looking at this from different perspectives and that's cool. I get that you think it's OK to "do what you have to" with what you've got and you're probably right. The two FF you reference probably can make a difference but that should be the exception, not the rule. Almost every OSHA regulation came about because we (not just the fire service) were doing stupid things that endangered worker safety.

The other problem is not every FF has the training, experience and/or wits to make the judgement calls that you speak of. Without that experience, they will put themselves into far more dangerous situations and eventually reach that point of no return. Think about bnechis's post about training at the FDNY Academy and differences between "upstate" crews and FDNY crews. At least those guys have the benefit of that kind of training and experience, the majority do not!

My issue is that they should never be put in that position because there shouldn't be just two qualified FF operating at a fire. The IC shouldn't be put in that position either. Bottom line is there are entirely too many departments that operate without enough personnel on a regular basis and without regulations and standards it would only be worse.

[wraftery 1,275]

I live in Chesapeake, VA now, and distance between firehouses are much more than he mile or two I was used to in the northeast. In the rural areas of this city of 215,000, there are places where the first due engine (a tanker) is close to10 min for the run to the scene. Second due is another 10 min. As we have learned, a typical fire doubles every 10 min, so with 3-man companies, the first due cannot make entry legally and must wait for the second due to make entry. That means the fire has grown to four times the size it was when the homeowner called 911. Aside from an exterior knockdown and wait for another company, there's not much OSHA will let you do.

Let's say that when the first due pulls up, the homeowner announces to the officer that her baby is inside. The officer repeats this to his crew and one guy goes VES at a rear window and makes a grab of the baby. What happens to the Officer and FF? They are heros and OSHA keeps its mouth shut.

But let's say the baby dies because the ff was waiting for the 2-out?. OSHA again is probably silent.

If the baby dies and the FF is injured? OSHA hangs everybody

The Motto if the story: Life is not fair, OSHA will probably hang you, and FF's usually listen to their conscience when they calculate Risk Assessment.

[Bnechis 3,961]

1) The problem is it is generally enforced retroactively - after something bad happens. You can get away with it until someone gets hurt, or worse, and then they will be under the microscope.

2) At issue isn't the interpretation but rather the underlying purpose of the regulation, which as I recall was to insure someone was there to rescue the crew if something happens in an IDLH environment.

3)Saying that two exterior FF is enough for the two out is a trap. If something happens to the crew in the IDLH, the exterior crew either has to rescue them in violation of the regulation or not rescue them and leave them to their fate.

4)I believe there are OSHA interpretations (really the only ones that count) that say the IC or pump operator can count toward the two out (if they're qualified) but think about that practically. A mayday is transmitted and the IC abandons command to become part of the rescue crew. Who will know what's going on or where the mayday is coming from? Who will know how many people are operating and where? There are so many problems with that strategy it isn't funny. Likewise the pump operator. He abandons his post and goes to rescue the crew only to find that more water is needed or another line needs to be charged by another crew. Bad plan!

5)The underlying problem is no standard for FF (outside of the career service) - at least in NYS - and no compliance with NFPA 1710 or 1720 to make sure enough qualified FF are on the scene.

Wow, I go away for a few days and have to catch up.

1) you are correct, but in addition to being retroactively addressed, this really leaves the dept and possibly its leadership open for litigation if a FF is injured or killed and the dept. knowingly is violating this law.

2) As Fire Medic put it:"the 2 in / 2 out rule is that it really wasn't written with the fire service response to building fires in mind." It was written for industry, some hazmat issues, some fire brigade issues and Confined space issues. The idea was if you need SCBA or Supplied Air to stay alive in a work place, then you need a back-up. OSHA never said: "You Only Need 2", they said "you need a minimum of 2"

3) Its not really a trap, because the law says you can suspend the 2 out, when their is a known life hazard in the IDLH environment and you are attempting to make a rescue.

4) OSHA's interpretation is that anyone who is performing a critical roll outside the IDLH environment can not be considered part of the 2 out. So the pump operator who is not pumping can be part, but if leaving the operating pump might put others at risk than no. The IC has a critical roll (in getting more help) and it has been argued that he should never be part of the 2 out.

5) You are correct. NFPA 1710 does address this, by calling the 2 out an IRIC (immediate rescue intervention crew) and once a working fire is declared the standard is it needs to go to 4 members (RIC or FAST).

The real issue here is not enough manpower. and depts. that fight this are the ones how have the least manpower.

1) When you consider what the intent of the 2 in/2 out rule is, I would say that anybody who is counting non-interior qualified/capable personnel towards the 2 out are clearly fools.

2) As Dinosaur points out, the rule itself appears to ignore certain best practices for handling an incident, like the need for an IC and pump operator for situations the rule would apply to for the fire service.

3) The reality is that the rule is typically going to really only be a consideration during the initial stage of a fire response while additional units are still enroute.

4) As someone who's department has a minimum on duty staffing of 5 and had been as low as 4, it's certainly not ideal, but it is possible for the IC to man the pump and direct incoming units until additional personnel can arrive and take over that role.

5) Additionally, the 2 out is not going to be sufficient to perform a FF rescue in most cases.

6) So, it begs the question, depending on the situation at hand, is it better to initiate an interior fire attack (potentially halting the fire growth) with just your 2 in / 2 out or waiting until you have sufficient personnel to staff that plus an IC, a pump operator, etc., but allowing the fire to grow and potentially be "more dangerous" when the fire attack is initiated?

1) agreed

2) since the pump operator may not be part of the 2 out (once committed to pumping) and the IC clearly is not, the issue is do you (and by you I mean any FD) respond with enough interior firefighters to safely operate?

3) agreed

4) agreed, but does the ruling help your department prevent dropping down to an even lower response just by the fact the standard exists?

5) Universally true. Remember it was not the intent to rescue from an IDLH that was also on fire, zero visibility, high heat, deteriorating conditions. just a stable work place with an IDLH atmosphere.

6) No where does it prevent ff's from attacking an incipient fire or potentially a fire in the free burning stage. Everyone appears to have missed that one.

Personally I find the 2 in - 2 out rule to be overkill and another attempt to make things safer that ultimately makes them less safe.

Personally, I find too many depts. that are unwilling or unable to send enough firefighters to any incident, much less an active fire. THis should be a major tool to help depts. fight for minimum staffing.

[antiquefirelt 994]

Let's say that when the first due pulls up, the homeowner announces to the officer that her baby is inside. The officer repeats this to his crew and one guy goes VES at a rear window and makes a grab of the baby.

This is and always was specifically addressed in the rules that a known rescue is cause to suspend the 2 out. This was tested or clarification was requested early on when FD's asked for greater latitude in what a "known rescue" was. As I recall the ruling or guidance was pretty clear that their needed to be true evidence of a trapped occupant vs. it's 3 am and there's a car in the driveway.

[Bnechis 3,961]

Maybe we were way behind, but I don't remember FAST or RIT even being a "thing" until the 2 in/ 2 out rules came into affect. Before that we had back-up lines and "fresh crews", but personnel dedicated to rescuing our own on immediate stand-by? Nope. So while there may be some times we feel our hands are tied (or we're breaking the rules), it appears this is what it took for us to at least consider what it takes to save our own. We can't prove people would have died if they had ignored 2 in/ 2 out, but I bet we can find examples of members who have lived after being rescued by RIT/FAST?

It was not. So the idea of having a back up when their are lots of rigs on the scene is a good thing. Most depts. call for an additional unit to be FAST. Before that, you got nothing. Even FDNY with great staffing compared to most added a truck to cover this. Before that they had less resources on every scene.

In years past it was less of an issue, my dept. at one point had 5-6 members on an engine, now its 1/2 that. I know VFD's that were so "full" they had waiting lists. Those days are long gone.

Id love to see a Stat on what caused a FAST/RIT Team to be deployed and could it have been prevented by FFs just learning and doing their Job to the best of their ability and using good common sense. Yes there will always be the unpredictable/unforeseen events that unfold at an Incident causing both death and serious injuries to members but how many times are these unfortunate outcomes caused by our own members, both directly and indirectly, thru poor Strategy/Tactics and piss poor decision making on ones part, no matter what their Rank is. As Ive said numerous times, we are our own worst enemy more so then often and are to quick to point fingers and blame to cover up our mistakes. JMO.

Another good reason to have enough staffing, less likely to make those errors, when we have enough people to get the job done before the mistakes add up.

And as a result increasing everyones chances of getting injured or killed, and having to deploy your FAST/RIT Team instead of nipping it in the Butt! I believe they're some credibility to this point of view. JMO

Agreed, but again 2in/2out does not appear to be stopping anyone from attacking the fire.

Without a doubt this may be the case in many (most?) occurrences, but the incidents we go to rarely give us all the variables and therefore we must prepare for what might happen when we enter the wrong tactic for X or mistime a particular task. At worst using the common thinking on 2 in/2 out, they're saying that in the absence of a known rescue, you should have 6 personnel (IC, MPO, 2FF in, 2FF out) on scene before committing personnel to the interior fire area. Many of us are forced to modify that down to a smaller number and likely this is why we've not seen stronger language in defining the 2 out.

In the end we all know that we must consider the dangers of committing personnel to an interior firefight when there is no one readily available to assist them should something go wrong. Just having to weigh that decision vs. the old days of being halfway to the door before the brake was set likely has saved firefighters from injury or death.

I see way too many depts. that think a total response of 6 or less is sufficient. This gives a small amount of leverage to maintain at least that.

You just have to move "the line". Where does the IDLH begin?

Depends on what gasses you are talking about. Generally:

O2 levels below 19.5%

CO above 1,200 ppm

HCN above 50 ppm

Note: your little CO meter starts to beep at 35ppm...you have a ways to go.