NIOSH LODD Report - Baltimore Cty, MD - FF Mark Falkenhan

[SageVigiles 1,194]

Volunteer Firefighter Caught in Rapid Fire Event During Unprotected Search, Dies after Facepiece Melts - Maryland

Executive Summary

On January 19, 2011, at approximately 1855 hours, a 43-year-old volunteer fire fighter died after being caught in a rapid fire progression. The victim and another fire fighter were conducting a search of a third-floor apartment above the fire, which had started on the first floor. Conditions at the time of entry for the search crew indicated that the fire was under control. The fire had already breached the second-floor apartment through a sliding glass door in the rear of the structure but was oxygen-limited. Another crew was initiating a civilian rescue from the second-floor apartment above the fire when a rapid fire build-up occurred on the second floor. The fire and smoke traveled up the common stairwell, igniting the third-floor apartment and trapping the victim. The victim radioed multiple Mayday calls, but crews were unable to reach him before his facepiece melted from the extensive heat produced by the rapid fire progression. The other fire fighter who was with the victim was searching a bedroom and his exit was cut off by the rapid fire progression. He was forced to bail out a bedroom window and was injured by the fall. Rescue efforts were initiated, the victim was located, and removed from the third-floor apartment. The victim died from exposure to the products of combustion.

Contributing Factors

• Incident Management System
  
• Personnel Accountability System
  
• Rapid Intervention Crews
  
• Conducting a search without a means of egress protected by a hoseline
  
• Tactical consideration for coordinating advancing hoselines from opposite directions
  
• Building safety features, e.g., no sprinkler systems, modifications limiting automatic door closing
  
• Occupant behavior-leaving sliding glass door open
  
• Ineffective ventilation.
  

Key Recommendations

• Ensure the first-due arriving officer maintains the role of Incident Commander or transfers "Command" to the next arriving officer
  
• Ensure that a first-due company officer establishes command, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, does not become involved in fire-fighting operations, and ensures incident command is effectively transferred
  
• Fire departments should ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed at each structure fire
  
• Ensure fire fighters are trained in the procedures of searching above the fire and are protected by a hoseline
  
• Ensure that interior search crews' means of egress are protected by a staffed hoseline
  
• Ensure that a rapid intervention team or crew is established and available to immediately respond to emergency rescue incidents.
  

This is a pretty hairy one, but there's definitely some good knowledge to be gathered from this. I think I posted the ATF Model of this fire on here a few months back, if you haven't seen it there's a link in the NIOSH report. Definitely shows the importance of proper control of ventilation and protecting the stairwell, I think out of everything to take away from this report, those are the two most realistic things the individual firefighter can do to prevent something like this.

Rest in Peace Firefighter Falkenham

[sueg 77]

That, and if you are searching and performing a rescue without a hose line on a floor above the fire, close the door behind if it is safe to do so; then the products of combustion from the lower fire floors don't build up in your search area/room and create a similar incident.

And thanks for the posting - excellent reminder for us to look at all aspects of a fire.

Edited August 23, 2012 by sueg

[SageVigiles 1,194]

That, and if you are searching and performing a rescue without a hose line on a floor above the fire, close the door behind if it is safe to do so; then the products of combustion from the lower fire floors don't build up in your search area/room and create a similar incident.

And thanks for the posting - excellent reminder for us to look at all aspects of a fire.

Good point Sue, that's kind of what I meant about controlling ventilation though. I've been hearing a lot lately about the push to control ventilation INSIDE the building, because an amazing amount of fire and gases can be contained with a simple door or window being shut. Underwriters Laboratories study down in NYC and a few others are re-affirming that controlling your access/egress points can have a substantial effect on the fire spread and make your life a lot easier when it comes to controlling it. It almost sounds like a no-brainer thing to talk about, because we tell civilians to do it when their houses are on fire, but its often forgotten by the FD on the fireground.

Unfortunately I've also heard a lot of chatter after this report about NOT searching above the fire floor without a hoseline, that I disagree with. I cannot remember a time when I've had a hoseline on a search of the floor above. Most departments are not making their Truck Company drag a charged hoseline around during their aggressive primary search, its just not an efficient use of resources. That being said, in apartments like the one in this fire, its absolutely critical your second line gets in to protect that common interior stairwell to ensure ALL your personnel have a safe means of egress.

[JM15 386]

Unfortunately I've also heard a lot of chatter after this report about NOT searching above the fire floor without a hoseline, that I disagree with. I cannot remember a time when I've had a hoseline on a search of the floor above. Most departments are not making their Truck Company drag a charged hoseline around during their aggressive primary search, its just not an efficient use of resources. That being said, in apartments like the one in this fire, its absolutely critical your second line gets in to protect that common interior stairwell to ensure ALL your personnel have a safe means of egress.

I also agree, a well placed and operated hoseline to protect the stairs plus having a primary and backup means of egress in my oppinnion is a must and makes conducting that search safer.

[jd783 64]

Lots of good info thanks for posting

[wraftery 1,275]

I agree with Sage and JM 15. Almost all upper floor searches are done without a hoseline. At most, a hoseline will be placed at the bottom of the stairway to protect egress. With fire on the floor or floors below an upper floor Primary search should be done as quickly as possible and then members should get the hell out of there. Attempting to do such a search with a hoseline accompanyment would take too much time in many cases.

Of course, placement of egress ladders for the upper floor members is of paramount importance. If it is night time, "light up" the windows where you have placed the egress ladders, and also the egress points that came with the building such as fire escape windows. The guy that gets in trouble above the fire will instinctively look for light to find his way out.

[16fire5 693]

I have quickly reviewed the NIOSH report and I see a number of issues. Having previously read the Baltimore County report and the ATF report on the fire I believe NIOSH missed the mark on this. I disagree with a number of their conclusions related to the fire behavior and ventilation. The recent reasearch about fire dynamics and fire behavior directly disproves a number of their assumptions.

Attack from the rear (Side C)

At this fire the idiot occupant left the doors open to allow the cat to exit. The fire located in the rear kitchen of the apartment was given ventilation from the open rear sliding glass door and the open apartment door and open front door. A flow path developed with air feed from the rear and heat and products of combustion exited the front door. This situation probably made it impossible for the hoseline crew entering from the front door (side A) to decend stairs and extinguish the fire. The convective heat was beyond survivable and the hoseline was unable to hit the seat of the fire and thus had no chance of dimisishing the heat coming at them. The application of water from the rear easily knocked down the fire probably before the guys even stepped in the door. Small diameter hoselines do not push the fire. The temperatures everywhere after water is applied to the seat of the fire go down. Put water on the fire even through a window.

Ventilation

Reduces the chances of flashover and/or backdraft

Much of the documented reasearch by UL and NIST in multiple venues proves the opposite is true. It appears frequently that many times our ventilation is the catalyst for flashover.

I will review the report soon in much more depth but I was disappointed with this one. I still think the reports are very useful to us since they narative can paint a picture of the fire and events that lead up to firefighter deaths on the fireground. I believe the ATF did an excellent job showing how controlling the flow path could have potentially prevented this.

Edited August 24, 2012 by 16fire5