Report criticizes FDNY procedures during '03 fire

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Report criticizes FDNY procedures during '03 fire

BY WILLIAM MURPHY

STAFF WRITER, NY NEWSDAY

April 14, 2005

A federal report sharply criticizes Fire Department procedures in the death of a firefighter in a Manhattan mattress factory on Dec. 16, 2003.

Among other things, the report said Firefighter Thomas Brick and other members of Ladder Co. 36 fought a fire in the same two-story building six months earlier and failed to report that it had no sprinkler system and that combustible material was stored there.

An internal Fire Department report on the death failed to note the earlier fire, and it did not specifify that the unit had failed to report the lack of sprinklers or the presence of combustible material.

Department officials did not return phone calls for comment on the national report.

Brick, 30, of Flushing, who was the first city firefighter to die fighting a fire after 9/11, was part of the Oct. 28, 2001, graduation class at the Fire Academy.

The report from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, which routinely reviews line-of-duty firefighter deaths, was dated March 31 and was recently posted on its Web site.

The report, and an earlier Fire Department report that has not been publicized, outlined two other grim details not made public at the time:

Brick's immediate supervisor had no contact with him for 10 minutes before reporting him missing, then called off the search prematurely when he mistook another soot-covered firefighter for Brick.

Two firefighters operating a hose line at the second-floor doorway of the factory heard a scream they thought came from inside. They shut off the water and yelled back, but they heard no reply and resumed pumping water after 30 seconds.

Brick was found 15 minutes after the scream, about 30 feet from the hose line. Two pieces of the tin ceiling had fallen on him. His face mask was off and the glove was off his left hand.

The federal report theorized Brick had pulled off his mask to call for help and had taken off his glove to reach inside his protective coat to activate an emergency button on his portable radio. The official cause of death was smoke inhalation.

There were numerous tactical mistakes and equipment problems outlined in both reports, which were in agreement in many aspects.

Both reports found that Brick's personal alert system, which should have sent out a loud distress beep if he failed to move for about 30 seconds, apparently was shorted out.

The reports also found that passing subways on the Broadway elevated line in Inwood made radio conversations hard to hear, and fire personnel used poor discipline in radio communications.

Both reports assailed fire commanders for attacking the fire directly and said Brick and other members of his ladder company did not use a guide rope to help with a retreat

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some more info.....

NIOSH Releases Report on 2003 Death of FDNY Firefighter 

TERIA ROGERS 

Firehouse.com News 

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has released a report on Thomas Brick, a New York City firefighter who died in a warehouse fire in December 2003. 

The report outlines details of the fire and 13 recommendations to fire personnel and equipment manufacturers to minimize the risk of future incidents. Brick, who graduated from FDNY’s first class following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, had been with Ladder 36 in Manhattan for two years. 

On December 16, Ladder 36 was called to a fire at a furniture and mattress warehouse in Upper Manhattan. While entering the building the crew came upon heavy smoke and zero visibility in a stairwell leading to the second floor. 

Brick and his crew continued on to the second floor and searched for the origin of the fire with some difficulty. The warehouse had received a new shipment just hours before the fire; mattresses and furniture were stacked as high as the ceiling in some places. 

While searching Brick was separated from the crew. Due to high heat conditions an officer yelled for his team to get out and a missing member announcement was made. While inside, members of the crew thought they heard a scream but could not verify the source. 

Once outside Brick was mistakenly accounted for and an emergency message was called off. A final personnel accountability report (PAR) discovered that Brick was still missing and team members went back in to rescue the firefighter. 

Brick was found lying face down with his face piece removed and a Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) alarm that was inaudible. He was flown to New York Presbyterian Hospital where he was pronounced dead with a carboxyhemoglobin (COHb) level of 74.8%. 

Several factors account for the death of Thomas Brick and NIOSH have made 13 recommendations to eliminate similar occurrences in the future. The first recommendation is ensuring that fire departments conduct pre-incident planning on commercial structures. A pre-incident plan identifies deviations from normal operations and accounts for construction, protections systems, water supply and special conditions which in this case included skylights and a locked pull down door. The pre-incident plan for this structure would have noted that the warehouse was inspected in 2000 however the second floor was never accessed. 

Another recommendation to fire departments is ensuring that Incident Commanders (ICs) conduct a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to and during the operation. The level of risk must be compared to the ability to save lives or property. The warehouse was an unoccupied commercial building that required forced entry and provided a heavy fire load with mattresses and furniture. Also, upon entering firefighters discovered heavy smoke and zero visibility. 

Additional recommendations from NIOSH include reinforcing the danger of carbon monoxide, proper knowledge of radio operation and maintaining continuity and accountability on the fire grounds. 

To read the full report: 

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face200404.html