NYTimes Article: Firefighters in Queens Won’t Rush to All Calls

[SRS131EMTFF 471]

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/nyregion/04fire.html

Firefighters in Queens Won't Rush to All Calls

A million times a year, fire trucks are driven into the streets of New York City, usually at breakneck speeds with lights and sirens blaring. The rush is often critical: Firefighters converge on fires, douse the flames and save lives.

The same response applies in less serious situations — calls that are not life-threatening, which are expected to reach around 230,000 this year after steadily rising from 41,054 in 1969.

But with 35-ton rigs barreling through red lights and forcing traffic off the roads or through busy intersections, accidents occur, sometimes with deadly consequences. Nearly 700 times last year, the city's fire trucks collided with other vehicles and, occasionally, with one another.

I am curious to hear what FDNY Queens firefighters have to say about this. Exactly what calls will get this "go slow" or "respond on the quiet"? Lock outs, Lift assists, water leaks?

The point about sitting in traffic was one aspect that I felt was slightly downplayed, especially if you have ever been stuck in traffic on the various highways and byways in Queen, especially by the Airports, but thats just me.

[INIT915 1,119]

I am curious to hear what FDNY Queens firefighters have to say about this. Exactly what calls will get this "go slow" or "respond on the quiet"? Lock outs, Lift assists, water leaks?

The point about sitting in traffic was one aspect that I felt was slightly downplayed, especially if you have ever been stuck in traffic on the various highways and byways in Queen, especially by the Airports, but thats just me.

Although the article doesn't answer all the questions I can think of, in general, the approach closely mirrors a topic that has been addressed here on the board several times over, the undeniable overuse of RLS. Can anyone in ES say, with a straight face, that there isn't a problem and a better way to do things?

(Notice I say overuse, not abuse. There is a difference.)

[Guest jcnyc]

The specific responses are outlined in the pilot program. We are also advised to NOT use highways for traveling to boxes. This is a very bad idea, hopefully it will be shot down after response times go up all around and Bllomterd can not close another house.

[PFDRes47cue 653]

Interesting article. The idea makes perfect sense but there are issues with it. There needs to be a guarantee that the dispatch information is accurate. What will happen if they are responding to call that is reported to be false and they are responding "quiet" and it actually is a fire and someone dies? There needs to be someone who goes lights and sirens to the call first then confirms that a slow and quiet approach is the best choice. Perhaps a command vehicle can go lights and sirens to confirm the minor emergency. This would involve a less expensive vehicle and a much smaller vehicle. In the event of an accident, less damage would be done and less FDNY personnel would be involved since less people would be in the command vehicle. The problem with that is that a Battalion Chief does not go to all alarms, or at least not to my knowledge. It will be interesting to see how this test period works out and to see how the firefighter respond to the response change.

[FireMedic049 597]

I find it interesting that anytime this notion of responding and not using the red lights and sirens comes up, most people seem to have a bit of tunnel vision on the matter. It seems like they forget that we respond to more than just fires and life threatening situations.

The fire service in general could easily respond non-emergently to a good number of calls without an adverse effect, other than not arriving as quickly that is.

[helicopper 1,050]

Interesting article. The idea makes perfect sense but there are issues with it. There needs to be a guarantee that the dispatch information is accurate. What will happen if they are responding to call that is reported to be false and they are responding "quiet" and it actually is a fire and someone dies? There needs to be someone who goes lights and sirens to the call first then confirms that a slow and quiet approach is the best choice. Perhaps a command vehicle can go lights and sirens to confirm the minor emergency. This would involve a less expensive vehicle and a much smaller vehicle. In the event of an accident, less damage would be done and less FDNY personnel would be involved since less people would be in the command vehicle. The problem with that is that a Battalion Chief does not go to all alarms, or at least not to my knowledge. It will be interesting to see how this test period works out and to see how the firefighter respond to the response change.

Guarantee? Where do we get those in this line of work?

As for the information being false and someone dying - if the call is for a water leak or a lockout and that happens it's not going to be the FD's fault.

It has been proven time and time again that you don't need someone responding lights and siren to every call especially the kinds of calls being discussed in this article (water leaks, lock-outs, etc.). Clinging to the notion that everything we go to is an emergency is flawed and is eventually going to get someone hurt.

[grumpyff 1,159]

Once the public finds out that response times for service calls will be longer, I can almost guarantee they will start calling things in as structure fires or other emergency, in order to get quicker service.

Edited October 4, 2010 by grumpyff

[PFDRes47cue 653]

Once the public finds out that response times for service calls will be longer, I can almost guarantee they will start calling things in as structure fires or other emergency, in order to get quicker service.

I forgot to mention that. It is just a matter of time before they catch on. People aren't stupid and they are definitely impatient, the slower responses will piss people off and practically force them to falsify their "emergencies."

[Remember585 815]

If something is not conveyed to be a life-threatening emergency, why do we need lights & sirens?

And remember, in most cases, dispatch information is only as good as the information received by the caller(s).

And, one last thing, "break-neck speeds?" Really, NY Times? This stupid image of fire engines speeding out of control that is always described makes us look like morons, and the truth of the matter is that this just doesn't happen 95-99% of the time. "Break-neck" is a terrible description.

[ny10570 745]

The number of people who know how to work the system like that is not a substantial number. The problem is, when we find calls that were intentionally upgraded by the caller we get pissed and it makes those memories stronger. Truth be told the majority of my intentionally upgraded calls come from grumpy's street side brethren and ff's that don't want to spend 10, 20, or 30 minutes waiting on the low priority drunk, injury, or EDP.

Anyone who's been around long enough has calls that came across innocuous but found to be serious. Its going to happen occasionally. What happens much more frequently is idiot drivers getting in the way of 25 ton vehicles traveling at 30 mph.

[grumpyff 1,159]

Wasn't Bloomburg and Scopetta threatening transfers of officers a few years ago if response times didn't decrease? guess they realized that a slow response costs less than the lawsuits from firetruck involved accidents.

[M' Ave 1,466]

I don't think it's a problem in it's entirety. Water leaks and stuck elevators don't tend to be serious emergencies. That part I don't have a problem with. What I do have a problem with is the 2nd and 3rd due units responding 10-20 to structural boxes. So, if the 1st due engine get's in and it's a working fire, THEN the others can kick it up a notch and turn the siren on? That's stupid. What if the first due engine is out and the first due truck arrives REALLY ahead of the other units? They have to wait all that extra time for an engine from further away, and a slow moving 2nd due that is REALLY further away.

We tailor the speed of our responses on a regular basis. I know officers who won't use the siren for runs that we're familiar with and know are typically nonsense. We slow down and creep through all intersections. Believe me, it's only in the case of multiple calls and reports of people trapped or heavy fire that makes us step it up a lot.

I'm surprised they didn't give this pilot program a whirl in a certain Borough...........the one Borough that's responsible for about 50% of the accidents in the city. More specifically, that very small handful of companies that are responsible for the lion's share of that 50%.

[Bnechis 3,961]

Once the public finds out that response times for service calls will be longer, I can almost guarantee they will start calling things in as structure fires or other emergency, in order to get quicker service.

I forgot to mention that. It is just a matter of time before they catch on. People aren't stupid and they are definitely impatient, the slower responses will piss people off and practically force them to falsify their "emergencies."

Interesting, most times when we arrive at a minorcall in 5 minutes the caller states; "wow, you got here fast" but at a true emergency when we get there in 3 minutes the caller states; "It took you 20 minutes to get here".

Can I get that guarantee in writing? We have been doing nonemergency responses for decades and if we have had a handful of upgrades by callers that would be a lot.

How many people actually make enough 911 calls to figure this out and actually do this?

The bigger complaint we get on minor calls is; "why did you need to bring the big red truck or trucks, we just wanted 1 firefighter in a car".

[antiquefirelt 994]

I find it interesting that many people argue that RLS and unnecessary in many cases everywhere else, but seem to think NYC is a complete different situation? I've driven there plenty and would agree that traffic congestion is among the worst,but I don't see a difference between them and LA,Boston, the DC metro area, Honolulu, you name it. Slower response times? Sure to non-emergencies: who cares? Our monthly reports to City Council do not include the response times to non-emergency calls. Only calls where the NFIRs report shows a "Priority Response" (RLS) are factored into our average response times.

The same points ring true about the dispatch info in NYC as they do in Podunk: if you can't trust the dispatchers, work on that. Given the traffic issue, maybe calls that are questionable get bumped up to emergency responses vs. down to non-emergency? The citizens don't like waiting for non-emergency calls? Good, stop closing companies. This can only serve to cement the fact that closures will significantly impact all calls for service, emergencies or not. If response times are an issue, properly deploy stations and apparatus, don't make up the time recklessly speeding to boxes, which is not only dangerous to members but counterproductive to ensuring proper staffing. Of course all this is far easier to say than get done. And even more so in today's financial climate.

Running RLS to non-emergency calls is similar to doing more with less. The list of what's an emergency and what isn't is really going to be the key to ensuring life and limb are not endangered no matter what.

[aacofd40 6]

We have been running a hot (all with RLS) warm (first due engine RLS), cold (No RLS) response framework for a few years. We have experienced all the problems expected; a cold response for an alarm that turns out to be a working fire, the sick person who is complaining of leg pain that turns out to be have a cardiac issues, and the outside gas leak that has settled in neighbors basements.

My problem with this policy (ours, not FDNY's), is that it takes away responsibility and accountability from the officers. Regardless of the call, it is the officers responsibility to ensure the safe departure, travel, and arrival for the apparatus and the crew. Based on the nature, location, time of day, etc.. and the officers experience and training, he/she should be providing the direction and guidance for the type of response to ensure a safe and timely arrival. Response is a tactical decision - like deploying a handline, or setting up a collapse zone - so we should allow officers to be responsible for their units response and then to be accountable for those decisions.

By having more policies that take away the decision-making and responsibility from our line officers, we are not creating the strong leaders we need in the service.

Be safe,

JR

[antiquefirelt 994]

My problem with this policy (ours, not FDNY's), is that it takes away responsibility and accountability from the officers. Regardless of the call, it is the officers responsibility to ensure the safe departure, travel, and arrival for the apparatus and the crew.

Excellent point. My FD's policy requires the duty officer make the decision, not the dispatcher. The dispatcher merely relays all pertinent information for us to make an informed decision. Clearly this works well in a single house scenario and clouds the issue unless the first due is also the first on the air to report how the response will go. But in a situation such as FDNY where so much is already being decided by the dispatcher by protocol, it wouldn't seem a big stretch to have them state the response is hot or cold with modification by the first due company officer(s) if they feel it's in the best interest. That puts a lot of responsibility on the officer who goes against the dispatchers call, but allows some discretion by the officers who will actually be commanding the incident.

[JBE 328]

I'm trying to find the criteria for the 10-20 responses. What I remember was water leaks, stuck elevators, ERS boxes after 2300, Pull Boxes(second due engine, first and second due truck), Class E alarms have been modified to a Manhattan style(One Engine, or One Ladder and a BC) response(I think, I have to have the order in front of me). I don't see it in the Department Orders. I'm not really sure what to think of this. The dispatch system is messed up, in the sense that UCT forwards the information before we actually talk to the caller. We don't really get the chance to interrogate before we have to take action. The alarm is dropped in our laps, oftentimes with very little, if any, pertinent information.

I like how the reporter puts in that the 10-20 has been ignored for years. What a load. It's followed, when the first arriving company gets there and sees nothing. Other times, if it's a chronic false alarm/defective alarm system, the chief responding may put out the 10-20 as soon as we announce it on the radio. Like I said, I'm not sure what to think of this, but I'm not optimistic that things are going to improve.

[ryang 166]

For those looking for the specifics regarding the modified response: http://nycfire.net/forums/index.php/topic,7116.0.html

[JBE 328]

Here's the pilot program policy. Thx to TBendick and nycfire.net

Modified Response Plan

Introduction

The FDNY has employed a variety of modified response policies for over a decade. Some of the policies currently in effect include: 10-20 signal, ERS Box no contact and reduced response to Class E & J alarms (ABC 5-94).

Each of these policies has effectively reduced the number of lights and sirens responses each year. The department would like to expand the use of modified response by limiting the use these devices to additional incident types.

The Department will implement a pilot program that changes the response mode of units assigned to certain call types.

• Single units responding to Group 1 call-types will respond in the 10-20 mode.

• Second and third due units in Group 2 call-type will respond in the 10-20 mode, unless the 10-20 is cancelled.

• BARS alarms will be responded to by the first due engine only in emergency mode.

• Class E & J alarms will be responded to by the first due engine/ladder in emergency mode as per ABC 5-94

All traffic regulations would be observed by these units essentially following procedures outlined in the department's 10-20 policy. This change could almost cut in half, the number of lights and sirens responses to select call types.

Accident Reduction

Accident statistics for 2nd and 3rd due units are difficult to measure due to the methods used in compiling and recording the data. The following is a conservative estimate, obtained from the Safety Command, on the number of accidents involving the 2nd and 3rd due units. Unfortunately, this data could not be categorized by incident, so it is unknown what the nature of the response was when the accident occurred.

2008 Total Accidents - 684

2009 Total Accidents - 668

2008 2nd due accidents – 106

2008 3rd due accidents – 29

2009 2nd due accidents – 124

2009 3rd due accidents - 24

In 2009 an accident involving the 2nd due ladder and 3rd due engine responding to a reported gas leak resulted in a major accident causing severe injury to firefighters and significant damage to the apparatus. The potential savings to the department by averting just a single accident could be in the millions of dollars.

In addition to accident reduction, the expanded use of modified response may provide the following benefits:

• Reduce fuel and maintenance costs as apparatus burn more fuel in the response mode and travel further to reach their destination

• Improve unit coverage as second and particularly third due units will remain closer to their first due response areas when the disposition of the incident is obvious on arrival.

• Second and third due units will be available for priority reassignment, if necessary (structural fire, cardiac, etc).

• Reduce the effect of "pushing" vehicles into traffic and the probability of secondary accidents.

• Reduce noise pollution – quality of life

Where practical, this proposal seeks to expand modified response by identifying call types that could be classified as non emergencies or where a limited use of lights and sirens, based on the call type, would be appropriate.

According to statistics obtained from the FDNY Risk Management Plan and the Management Indicator Reporting System (MIRS), the number of non-fire emergencies has increased dramatically in recent years. Non-fire emergencies have gone from 123,762 in 1993 to an expected 230,000 in 2010. Many of the non-fire emergencies would be candidates for inclusion in the program.

Broadening Modified Response

A pilot program will be implemented in the Borough of Queens for a 3 month period to evaluate the impact of modified response. The policy will curtail the use of lights and sirens to select non-fire emergencies during single and multi-unit responses.

1. Purpose

1.1 To evaluate the impact of a modified response plan on fire operations as it relates to accident and injury prevention, unit availability and response times. Responding with lights and sirens is one of the most dangerous activities undertaken by firefighters. National studies indicate limiting the use of lights and sirens responses to true emergencies can significantly reduce the number and severity of apparatus accidents and firefighter injuries. This is particularly true in the case of intersection accidents.

1.2 The policy goal is to increase responder and civilian safety by reducing accident

exposure and still provide a high level of service to the public.

2. Definitions

2.1 Emergency Mode – An emergency vehicle responds with all appropriate warning devices (i.e., lights and sirens) operating and displayed.

2.2 Signal 10-20 – Responding units are to proceed at reduced speed. No warning devices are to be used and all traffic regulations are to be observed. Under Modified Response, second and third due units will respond without the use of lights and sirens in the 10-20 mode.

3. Response Type

3.1 Group 1

The following incidents are classified as modified single unit emergencies and assigned as single unit responses. Responding units would operate in the 10-20 mode while responding to these select call types. Signal 10-84 would be transmitted upon arrival.

Group 1 Call Type

3.1.1 Water leaks

3.1.2 Trees down (no wires affected)

3.1.3 Lock-ins (no reported food on the stove or other associated emergency)

3.1.4 Salvage Truck

3.1.5 ERS no contact (23:00 to 08:00 hr)

3.2 Group 2

The following incidents are classified as modified multi-unit emergencies requiring the response of multiple units. Units that are assigned first-due on the MDT shall respond in the Emergency Mode Second and third due units shall respond in the 10-20 mode. All units are required to transmit signal 10-84 upon arrival at the reported location.

Response to BARS alarms will be a single unit response - first due engine only (emergency mode) for the duration of the pilot period.

Response to Class E & J alarms will be the a single unit response - first due engine/ladder (emergency response) as per ABC 5-94 for duration of pilot period.

Group 2 Call Type

3.2.1 Odors - gas, fumes, etc., other the smoke

3.2.2 Sprinkler/valve alarm

3.2.3 Automatic alarms – Class 3

3.2.4 Electrical emergencies

3.3.5 Manhole emergencies

3.3.6 BARS – first due engine only (emergency mode)

3.3.7 Class E & J alarms – first due engine/ladder response (emergency mode

Note:

When a battalion chief or company officer receives additional information regarding the incident from the dispatcher, he/she may cancel the 10-20 response mode. Dispatcher

shall announce that the 10-20 response is cancelled and that all units should respond in the emergency mode.

3.3 First arriving officer will make an evaluation of the incident and transmit the appropriate signal as per existing department policy. Units not on scene will either continue into the incident or be placed 10-8 (in-service) based on the evaluation and signal transmitted by the first arriving officer.

4. Training

4.1 The Bureau of Communications would be required to review, evaluate and train dispatchers in the new policies as dispatch is a critical component in the policy.

4.2 The office of the Queens Borough Command will meet with Battalion and Deputy Chiefs to explain the details of the pilot program and address any concerns.

4.3 Training programs will be conducted through the medium of company drills monitored by Battalions and Divisions. Company drill periods on the 9x6 and 6x9 tours shall include a review of the modified response policy, with records of training sessions recorded in the company journal.

4.4 Sufficient lead-time of at least two weeks prior to the implementation of the program should be allowed to insure all members are trained in the new policy. Records of training are to be recorded by unit officer and forwarded to the Queens Borough Command upon completion of the training period.

4.5 Copies of the policy should be kept at the teleprinter in the house watch as well as the dashboard of the apparatus to insure units respond in the proper mode.

4.6 Daily safety message transmitted by the Queens Communication Office will include a brief reminder that the pilot program is in effect and units are to respond as per the pilot program protocol.

5. Program Monitoring

5.1 Battalion and Deputy Chiefs will complete monthly evaluation reports on the effect of the policy. These reports shall be forwarded to the Bureau of Operations through the Borough Command.

5.2 Each unit shall keep a separate CD-14 (Company Operations Record) in addition to their existing CD-14 to track responses made under the pilot program. Units shall indicate on the additional CD-14 all modified response assignments and whether they were first, second or third due, as well as, the disposition of the incident.

5.3 At the completion of each month, a copy of the dedicated CD-14 will be forwarded to Battalions and Divisions for evaluation prior to forwarding to the Queens Borough Command.

5.4 Any unusual occurrence resulting from the program will be reported immediately through the chain of command, to the Queens Borough Command or Command Chief on Duty

6. Cancellation of Policy

6.1 Borough supervising dispatcher can cancel the pilot program due to periods of heavy fire traffic affecting unit availability, or where a "FALLBACK" procedure has been implemented.

7. Statistical Data

7.1 Responses made by units in a 10-20 mode under group 1, would not be included in a units overall response time calculations. These responses would have to be extracted from the response time calculations.

7.2 All accidents in the pilot area should be tracked and categorized by:

• How the incident was dispatched (reported condition)

• How unit was assigned (1st, 2nd, 3rd due)

• If accident occurred in modified response mode

• Nature and severity of the accident

• Final disposition of incident

7.3 The Safety Command should take an active role in developing the statistical data necessary to evaluate the program and measure its effectiveness.

Conclusion

The intent of the program is to provide an increased measure of safety to both firefighters and civilians while maintaining the highest level of service to the public. According to the NFPA (National Fire Protection Association), units using lights and sirens have a three time greater risk of being involved in an apparatus accident then units not utilizing lights and sirens.

While units are responding in a more cautious manner on the road, it is essential that normal turnout procedures be followed, regardless of the nature of the call. Once again, the intent of the program is to provide for a safe response, not a slow response.

Exhibit A

General Response Policy to Class 3 Alarms

Source: Bureau of Communication, Henry Dingman

1) Private House or Private unit within a Multiple Dwelling = 1 Engine, 1 Ladder

2) Public Area with in Multiple Dwelling = 1 Engine, 1 ladder, 1 BC

3) Class E & J alarms = 3 Engines, 2 Ladders, 1 BC

4) Class E & J alarm Pilot Program (ABC 5-94) = 1 Engine or 1 Ladder with DRB for the

BC

5) Public Assembly: Schools, Hospitals, Nursing Homes, etc = 3 Engines, 2 Ladders,

1 BC

6) General Commercial (valve/automatic) 1 Engine, 1 Ladder, 1 BC

7) Commercial (store) manual: 3 Engine, 2 Ladder, 1BC

Other combinations and Enhanced Alarms are as per Pre-Incident Guides (PG) or CIDS on case by case basis mandating: minimum 3 Engine, 2 Ladder, 1 BC response.

Also wanted to add, Queens dispatchers are also being tasked with classifying the emergencies differently for tracking purposes.

[FireMedic049 597]

We have been running a hot (all with RLS) warm (first due engine RLS), cold (No RLS) response framework for a few years. We have experienced all the problems expected; a cold response for an alarm that turns out to be a working fire, the sick person who is complaining of leg pain that turns out to be have a cardiac issues, and the outside gas leak that has settled in neighbors basements.

My problem with this policy (ours, not FDNY's), is that it takes away responsibility and accountability from the officers. Regardless of the call, it is the officers responsibility to ensure the safe departure, travel, and arrival for the apparatus and the crew. Based on the nature, location, time of day, etc.. and the officers experience and training, he/she should be providing the direction and guidance for the type of response to ensure a safe and timely arrival. Response is a tactical decision - like deploying a handline, or setting up a collapse zone - so we should allow officers to be responsible for their units response and then to be accountable for those decisions.

By having more policies that take away the decision-making and responsibility from our line officers, we are not creating the strong leaders we need in the service.

Be safe,

JR

I disagree. The fact that you have a policy to guide the "rate of response" (hot/warm/cold) does not diminish your officers' "responsibility and accountability". They are still very much responsible for ensuring a safe response by their apparatus.

I agree that the officers should have the ability to "alter" the "rate of response" to account for all of those factors that you just can't "legislate" for. The EMS system I work in uses an EMD protocol to assign calls to one of 5 "priority" categories - 3 "ALS" and 2 "BLS". The County Dispatch policy has response "recommendations" for each, but the individual services decide if the response for each category should be hot or cold. However, at least at the service I work at, we have the ability to "upgrade" or "downgrade" our rate of response (hot vs cold) based on our experience, information provided, etc. For example, psych calls typically get put into the 2nd highest category which is normally a hot response, however we often handle them as a cold response due to the fact that they're typically not a life threatening matter. There are also times in which we will "upgrade" our response based on various factors, but that doesn't happen as much since calls typically get "over-prioritized" rather than "under-prioritized".

Regardless, we are still responsible and accountable for the decisions that we make and whatever happens as a result.

[16fire5 693]

I'm suprised elevators are not included. I find it hard to respond to them in the emergency mode. If you look at it nothing the FDNY considers structrural is involved. The one thing I see that is missing is the ability of the dispatcher to upgrade the alarm.

[JBE 328]

I think there is always a potential life hazard with stuck elevators, hence it being omitted. Meaning sick passengers, etc. I'm not sure what you mean by upgrading, though. If you mean filling out an alarm due to a second source, we can do that.