FDNY Deutsche Bank LODD's

[Bunkers 0]

DISTRICT ATTORNEY - NEW YORK COUNTY

NEWS RELEASE

December 22, 2008

Contact: Alicia Maxey Greene

212-335-9400

Manhattan District Attorney Robert M. Morgenthau announced today the results of the investigation into the August 18, 2007, fire at the Deutsche Bank building, located at 130 Liberty Street, in which Firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino lost their lives.

Three individuals and one company have been indicted for manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment in the deaths of the firefighters. Those indicted are: JEFFREY MELOFCHIK, the Site Safety Manager for the project’s construction manager, Bovis Lend Lease LMB, Inc. (“Bovis”); MITCHEL ALVO, the Director of Abatement, for Bovis’ subcontractor, THE JOHN GALT CORP. (“GALT”) and SALVATORE DePAOLA, a GALT foreman. GALT has also been indicted on the same charges.

In addition, the District Attorney’s Office has reached agreements with the City of New York (the “City”) and Bovis, which require the City and Bovis to institute major remedial safety measures.

Mr. Morgenthau, “Our goal is to put in place procedures which will prevent a disaster of the magnitude of the Deutsche Bank fire and to make sure that firefighters are never again exposed to the risks they faced in that fire.”

Mr. Morgenthau further said, “The investigation into the fire at the Deutsche Bank building has been one of the most complex we have ever conducted. Over the last 16 months we have interviewed more than 150 people, subpoenaed and examined over three million documents and presented more than 80 witnesses to a Grand Jury; the transcript of that testimony is more than 6,500 pages long.”

We now know what happened at the Deutsche Bank building: what caused the fire, what went wrong and who is responsible. In addition to today’s indictments and agreements, we are issuing a statement summarizing our findings. It is our hope that the public release of the summary, together with the remedial actions our agreements mandate, will help insure that no future tragedies like the one at the Deutsche Bank building will ever take place.”

THE BUILDING

The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, caused the South Tower of the World Trade Center to collapse onto the Deutsche Bank building, creating a 15-story gash in the building’s north side. The collapse filled the building with debris, asbestos, World Trade Center dust, and other hazardous substances. The building’s sprinkler system was permanently disabled, leaving the building’s dry standpipe system as the only means of bringing water into the building for fire fighting. (A dry standpipe system is “dry” until it is charged with water when firefighters connect a water source (e.g., a hydrant) to a Siamese connection on the outside of the building which connects to risers ascending vertically within the building to each floor.)

Because of the contamination of the building, it had to be demolished. A plan was formulated simultaneously to decontaminate and deconstruct it; such a project had never been done before in New York City. Bovis was selected by the building’s owner, the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (“LMDC”), to be the construction manager. Bovis, in turn, selected Galt to do the deconstruction and abatement work.

The simultaneous abatement and deconstruction clearly made the building a fire hazard. Acetylene torches were used to cut the steel and concrete superstructure while abatement was going on floors below. At least seven small fires occurred in the building in the three months before the fatal fire.

In addition, the floors that were undergoing abatement had to be sealed from the other floors. This involved constructing containment barriers in the stairwells of the building; these barriers were made of plywood and were covered with plastic sheeting. However, these barriers, which under the original plan were supposed to be walls (vertical) were actually built horizontally (like floors), blocking the stairs. As a result, the barriers cut off the stairwells’ access to the rest of the building on the floors undergoing abatement.

THE FIRE

On August 18, 2007, a massive fire raged through nine stories of the Deutsche Bank building. The fire was caused by a cigarette discarded in the south vestibule on the 17th floor. Firefighters responded immediately, and pursuant to Fire Department procedure, set up a staging area on the 15th floor, two floors below the fire, at 3:43 p.m. When firefighters attempted to ascend from the staging area to fight the fire above, they were blocked by containment barriers in the stairwells. Without knowing how the barriers had been constructed, it took 20 minutes to breach the barriers between the 15th and 16th floors.

Other firefighters were attempting to access water to fight the fire. Firefighters hooked up to two separate Siamese connections outside the Deutsche Bank building and started pumping water into the standpipe system. However, no water was reaching the firefighters on the upper floors trying to fight the fire. As a result, firefighters created an exterior riser to get water onto the fire. They did this by using a construction hoist and physically hauling hose line up to the 14th floor landing. This exterior hose line was charged with water approximately 61 minutes after firefighters first entered the building.

Meanwhile, conditions in the building deteriorated rapidly as smoke and fire quickly descended downward. The fire, which had first been identified on the 17th floor quickly descended to the 16th and then the 15th floor. Thick, choking smoke reduced visibility to near zero, disorienting many of the firefighters and chasing others down to the 14th floor. The 14th floor provided only a brief respite; before long it too was filled with impenetrable black smoke. Still, there was no water to fight the fire or dissipate the smoke.

Firefighters attempted to escape the deadly conditions by descending below the 14th floor – but their escape was blocked by the containment barriers in the 14th floor stairwells. With no water and further downward egress prevented by the stairwell barricades, it became a chaotic situation.

Among the firefighters caught in the chaos were Firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino. With water finally available from the outside riser, they attempted to fight the fire, but the conditions were too severe. Along with colleagues from Engine 24, Graffagnino and Beddia, tried to retreat from the intense smoke and heat of the 15th floor landing. Beddia was working the nozzle with Engine Company 24 Backup (“24 Backup”) directly behind him. Graffagnino was working the control position, keeping the hose from getting entangled. As 24 Backup turned to descend the stairs, he observed Graffagnino gasping for air behind him, in the stairwell between the 14th and 15th floors. Graffagnino was experiencing oxygen-deprivation and was unable to comply with 24 Backup’s pleas to crouch to the floor to get under the smoke. 24 Backup attempted to pull Graffagnino down, but 24 Backup slipped and fell, his hand landing on a garden hose that had been used in the abatement process, which 24 Backup previously had seen leading to the outside hoist. Knowing that the only way to save Graffagnino and Beddia would be to reach the hoist and get assistance, 24 Backup followed the garden hose through the dense smoke to the hoist landing. Along the way, 24 Backup transmitted a Mayday. Firefighters from Rescue Company 1 reentered the 14th floor in search of Graffagnino and Beddia. Both were found unconscious shortly thereafter on the 14th floor.

Firefighters Beddia and Graffagnino died as a result of injuries sustained fighting the fire at the Deutsche Bank building. Beddia was 53-years-old; Graffagnino was 33. In addition to the deaths of Graffagnino and Beddia, 105 other firefighters suffered a myriad of other injuries.

THE FAILURES: BOVIS AND GALT

The investigation determined that the failure to get water up to the firefighters was a direct cause of the deaths of Graffagnino and Beddia. In turn, that failure was caused by a critical breach in the standpipe system in the basement of the building. The breach occurred during the abatement process in the basement.

Asbestos removal began in the basement in the summer of 2006. At that time, the ceiling included a multitude of different pipes stretching throughout the cellar and beyond. Nonetheless, it was commonly known among asbestos supervisors that there were certain “untouchable pipes,” one of which was the building’s standpipe. The standpipe itself was distinguishable from the other pipes; it was a large, heavy pipe, connected in sections by red clamps.

Abatement of the basement pipes was an arduous and lengthy process. It required that the pipes be washed and then scrubbed with a variety of different brushes. Moreover, every area abated, including the basement pipes, had to pass inspection by the city, state and federal environmental regulators on the site; if the area failed inspection, the entire abatement process has to be repeated until it passed. This led to delays and additional expense.

The standpipe was particularly problematic to clean. It was held by circular hangers that were attached to rods hanging vertically at intervals from the ceiling. The only way to clean the rods and hangers (and the bolts and screws holding them together) was to use small wire hand brushes. Abatement workers cleaned the pipe for weeks, closely supervised by GALT bosses, who made it clear to the workers that they needed to work faster. ALVO, GALT’s abatement director, personally inspected the cleaning of the standpipe, scrubbing it with a small brush and examining the hangers that held it to the ceiling.

To expedite the process, in or about the fall of 2006, GALT supervisors decided to remove the most troubling portions of the problem. They sawed off the hanging rods that supported the standpipe within inches of the ceiling. It was a decision with deadly consequences: without proper support, a large portion of the standpipe broke free and crashed to the ground. Another large portion also tore loose and hung semi-suspended by the remaining clamps.

The sound of the pipe crashing to the ground reverberated throughout the lower parts of the Deutsche Bank building and soon drew a crowd to the basement. DePAOLA, ALVO and MELOFCHIK, gathered at the foot of the broken standpipe. The decision was made to disconnect the precariously hanging section and remove it from the building along with the section that initially had fallen to the ground. As a result, and under the direction of DePAOLA and ALVO, workers cut the two sections of pipe into smaller pieces, which were bagged and discarded. The open ends of the standpipe then were sealed with tape and glue.

The removal of the two sections resulted in a gaping, 42-foot breach in the standpipe. The broken standpipe was neither repaired nor reported by those who knew, or should have known, that the building was now defenseless against the threat of significant fire. From in or about the fall of 2006 to August 18, 2007, the standpipe remained inoperable because of the 42-foot-long breach.

Not only was there a 42-foot gap in the standpipe, but MELOFCHIK prepared false paperwork indicating that the standpipe was in working order. Beginning no later than December 2006, through the day of the fire, MELOFCHIK filled out a five-page Project Checklist at the end of each workday. Each checklist contained multiple categories identifying building safety issues – 158 in all.

Even though the building’s fire suppression equipment was not functioning (the sprinkler was inoperable and the standpipe was broken), MELOFCHIK did not indicate it on the checklists. In fact, during that entire period, the daily Project Checklists are virtually identical in every material respect except for the date and MELOFCHIK’s hand-written initials. All of the entries in the Project Checklists were computer-generated, with the exception of the signature line. None of the numerous fires and accidents that occurred in the building prior to the fire was ever listed in the Project Checklists.

In addition, the sections of the Project Checklist indicating “stairways clean and clear” and “paths of emergency egress kept clear” are always checked in the affirmative, never indicating the existence of containment barriers. Although most of the checklists bear MELOFCHIK’s signature, Bovis Site Superintendents knew that there were occasions when others who were not licensed Site Safety Managers reportedly performed the inspections for MELOFCHIK and then forged his initials to make it appear he had done the inspections.

As a result of their roles in the dismantling of the standpipe and the failure to maintain unobstructed egress, MELOFCHIK, ALVO, DePAOLA, and GALT have each been indicted on two counts of Manslaughter in the Second Degree, two counts of Criminally Negligent Homicide, and one count of Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree.

THE CITY’S FAILURES

The investigation further documented failures by City agencies involved in the project that contributed to the conditions that led to the deaths of Firefighters Graffagnino and Beddia, principally the New York City Fire Department (“FDNY”) and the Department of Buildings (“DOB”).

a. The Fire Department

The investigation concluded that despite its own rules, the FDNY failed ever to conduct a thorough inspection of the Deutsche Bank building prior to the fatal fire. As a result, firefighters rushed into the building with no idea of the obstacles they would face in fighting the fire.

The FDNY’s “15-Day Rule” requires that firefighters inspect buildings undergoing construction and demolition “at least every 15 days, but more where conditions dictate.” This regulation requires the FDNY to focus “particular attention” on 18 specified conditions, including standpipe systems. The standpipe requirements, taken in conjunction with the New York City Building Code, mandate that a standpipe must be kept in a state of readiness at all times for Fire Department use. While it is the owner’s obligation to maintain the standpipe, it is the FDNY’s and DOB’s obligations to inspect.

From the time of the attack on the World Trade Center, the Deutsche Bank building was never thoroughly inspected by the FDNY. The investigation determined that this was the result of two related factors. First, firefighters do not view inspections as a priority. Second, the failure to give priority to inspections was magnified at the Deutsche Bank building because the building was contaminated. Consequently, the “Toxic Tower,” as the building was commonly called, went un-inspected.

Moreover, high ranking FDNY officers knew not only that the 15-Day Rule was not being enforced at the Deutsche Bank building, but that fire companies throughout the City were not inspecting buildings under construction and demolition with the required regularity. The investigation disclosed that the 15-Day Rule was rarely, if ever, enforced; in fact, it became a rule almost universally ignored. It was ignored even though high-ranking fire officials clearly recognized that buildings undergoing construction, demolition and abatement were extremely dangerous for firefighting operations.

Even an accident resulting in firefighter injuries and damage to the Engine10/Ladder10 Firehouse (the “10/10 Firehouse”), located across the street from the Deutsche Bank building, did not motivate anyone in the FDNY to inspect the toxic building. This fact is illustrated by an accident on May 17, 2007 -- a mere three months before the fatal fire -- when a 15-foot pipe fell from the Deutsche Bank building through the 10/10 Firehouse roof, injuring two firefighters. The accident provoked a reaction at the highest levels of the Fire Department. The Fire Commissioner, accompanied by senior fire officers, visited the 10/10 Firehouse after the pipe fell and ascended to the roof to examine and assess the damage. Yet, even with the Deutsche Bank building looming over them, no one ever inquired whether regular inspections were being conducted at the building.

The FDNY also failed to develop a special firefighting operations plan for the Deutsche Bank building, despite numerous recommendations that it do so. As early as December 2004, a memo was written by a FDNY captain to his Division Chief requesting the creation of a fire incident plan with operational guidelines for future responses to the Deutsche Bank building. There was never a response to this memo.

Then, in February 2005, a memo was written by a Hazmat Battalion Chief and forwarded to the then-Chief of Operations containing recommendations for an emergency firefighting operation plan for the building. However, the Chief of Operations neither approved nor endorsed the recommendations; nor did he distribute them to the first-due units, the 10/10 Firehouse, or the Battalion, Division, Special Operations Command or the Manhattan Borough Command.

Finally, on three occasions between January and March 2005, a FDNY Battalion Chief, along with a Hazmat chief and a lieutenant from the local fire company, visited the Deutsche Bank building. These visits each entailed an interview of the construction manager for the building and brief tours of the basement and first floor. The Battalion Chief wrote memos summarizing each of the visits and making recommendations for a specialized firefighting plan for the Deutsche Bank building.

Although the Battalion Chief’s memos were sent to the Division Commander, no apparent action was taken in response. Importantly, the memos did not result in the creation of a special firefighting plan for, or inspections of, the Deutsche Bank building. Hence, on August 18, 2007, in addition to fatally faulty intelligence about the conditions firefighters would face, there was no special plan in place for firefighting operations in the dangerous building.

In addition, the Fire Department’s “target hazard program,” fell into disuse. Historically, a “target hazard” was a large or complicated building that presented operational issues for the FDNY. If a building was identified as a target hazard, it would be inspected by a Battalion Chief and an operational plan for firefighting in the building would be created. Thereafter, the building would be the site of multiple unit drills. The Deutsche Bank building would have qualified as a target hazard, but the FDNY had discontinued the target hazard program long before the Deutsche Bank fire. Again, this represented a lost opportunity to make sure that firefighters entering the “toxic tower” would know what conditions they would encounter.

b. The Department of Buildings

While the contractors failed to maintain a readily available water supply and free egress from the Deutsche Bank building, DOB inspectors failed adequately to inspect and enforce the contractors’ compliance.

Despite being on-site every day, DOB’s inspectors never once went into the northeast quadrant of the Deutsche Bank building’s basement where the 42-foot gap in the standpipe existed. The DOB did not detect the breach in the standpipe because its inspectors never ventured into the section of the basement where the gap existed. In addition, they never traced the standpipe connection in the northeast quadrant of the basement. Had it been traced just once, the 42-foot gap would have been discovered and repaired.

Additionally, DOB inspectors did nothing about the contractor’s failure to maintain proper egress from the building. Exit passageways were required to be clearly visible and free of obstructions at all times, and stairwells were required to be maintained up to the floor immediately below the demolition floor. Thus, DOB building inspectors knew, or should have known, that the Building Code required the Deutsche Bank building to have unobstructed egress and clear stairwells during demolition. In fact, the stairways were blocked by unmarked containment barriers that did not permit unobstructed egress. In short, DOB inspectors knew the stairways were blocked, but failed to recognize that it violated DOB code. More importantly, it created a severe safety hazard.

Part of the DOB’s failings can be attributed to the inexperience of the inspectors assigned to the Deutsche Bank building. Initially, the DOB sought to staff the project with inspectors from its BEST Squad, which is comprised of inspectors who specialize in inspecting, among other things, deconstruction sites. This plan was altered, however, in the beginning of 2007 in favor of staffing the building with inexperienced inspectors who volunteered for the assignment. Their inspections were supplemented with periodic inspections from BEST Squad personnel. In any event, neither team of inspectors traced the standpipe into the basement or otherwise discovered the 42-foot breach in the standpipe.

Compounding DOB’s failures were those of the environmental regulators, including the Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”). Because the LMDC exempted itself from “local law,” including DEP’s regulations, inspection and enforcement of the abatement activities at 130 Liberty was the exclusive responsibility of the New York State Department of Labor (“DOL”). However, DEP inspectors voluntarily assisted DOL by providing additional inspectional staff and coordinating inspectional activities. Federal EPA inspectors were also on site. The DEP, DOL and EPA inspectors who were at the site regularly, knew, or should have known, that the containment barriers which sealed stairwells violated Code by failing to provide appropriate egress. At no time did any of the inspectors take any actions to remedy the condition.

CONCLUSION

In summary, everyone failed at the Deutsche Bank building. The contractors violated their contractual provisions and City rules and regulations in the way they conducted the abatement and deconstruction of the building. Worse, they dismantled a large section of the standpipe in the basement with catastrophic results. In turn, the City and its agencies, especially the Fire Department and the Department of Buildings failed to discover the gaping hole in the building’s fire protection system. A single inspection of the basement would have uncovered the disabled standpipe, yet that inspection never took place. The Fire Department repeatedly ignored its own rules in not conducting mandated 15-Day inspections and the Department of Buildings never did an inspection in the basement despite having inspectors on-site day in and day out. Finally, the FDNY and DOB failed to enforce compliance with requirements that the containment barriers be built to maintain unobstructed egress from the building. These failures contributed to the conditions that led to the deaths of Firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino and the injuries to approximately 105 other New York City firefighters were injured in the blaze of August 18, 2007.

THE AGREEMENTS

As a result of the investigation’s conclusions, the District Attorney’s Office has entered into agreements with the City and Bovis which require that each institute substantial remedial safety measures to prevent another catastrophic fire. The full agreements are attached. In addition, the City and Bovis have issued a public statement in response to the investigation’s findings, which are also attached.

a. The Agreement with the City

In response to the investigation’s determination that FDNY inspections were inadequate at the Deutsche Bank building, the City has agreed to establish a dedicated inspectional force whose only job will be to conduct inspections at buildings undergoing construction, demolition and/or abatement (“CDA”).

The new unit, to be created within the FDNY, called the “Fire Prevention CDA Inspection Team” (the “Team”) will consist of 25 civilian inspectors -- 5 supervisors and 20 line inspectors -- who will focus exclusively on inspections of buildings under construction, demolition and abatement. The Team will pay particular attention to building standpipes. As buildings convert to pressurized alarm systems, the Team will check the pressure gauge on the alarm system to assure that the standpipe is functioning as part of every CDA inspection. For those buildings under construction or demolition that do not have an alarm system in place, or if otherwise necessary, the Fire Prevention CDA Inspection Team. All inspections done by the Team will be certified.

In addition, local fire companies will conduct familiarization drills at each CDA site once every three months to stay abreast of current conditions. If the risk-based analysis for a particular CDA site indicates a need to inspect that site more frequently than every 30 days, the Team will assist the local company in conducting follow-up inspections. Fire companies will be required to certify that familiarization drills have taken place.

The FDNY will also add two new civilian staff members to the Fire Prevention Suppression Unit to conduct random audits of the inspections including auditing standpipe systems in ten percent of CDA buildings each month. The FDNY will also add three data management technicians who will coordinate inspections, review DOB and DEP databases for violations prior to inspections, enter inspection data into FDNY databases, and check DOB and DEP databases for violations prior to inspections.

The FDNY will add five new civilian staff members to the Compliance Unit who will perform quality assurance and audit functions on uniformed and civilian inspections at CDA locations. The Fire Department anticipates this group will perform quality assurance reviews of thousands of inspections each year.

The FDNY will add two new civilian staff members consisting of 1 attorney and 1 investigator in the Bureau of Investigations & Trials ("BITS"), the Department's disciplinary unit, who will develop expertise in inspection requirements. These new staffers will help to ensure accountability by initiating disciplinary proceedings when audit results indicate that officers, firefighters or civilian inspectors are not complying with inspection requirements.

The FDNY will designate an Assistant Chief of Fire Prevention and Inspections who will have oversight over all of the inspectional responsibilities within the Bureau of Fire Prevention, including the new Fire Prevention CDA Inspection Team. That position will be held by a three-star Assistant Chief. To enhance the management of the Bureau, the Assistant Chief will be aided by a new uniformed Staff Chief and a new civilian Director of Inspectional Services. The Fire Department will also add a civilian staff member with a Master's degree in management to assist with data management and fiscal functions.

The FDNY will establish a joint labor-management committee to discuss additional improvements to the Fire Department’s inspection program for the benefit of firefighters and public safety.

The City will prepare and make public a report of the activities of the Fire Prevention CDA Inspection Team, the Fire Prevention Suppression Unit and the Compliance Unit not less than yearly.

Finally, the City agrees that it will not discontinue or substantially diminish the personnel of the Fire Prevention CDA Inspection Team, the Fire Prevention Suppression Unit and the Compliance Unit for four years.

b. The Agreement with Bovis

The District Attorney’s Office and Bovis have entered into a Non-Prosecution Agreement under which Bovis will not be prosecuted in exchange for taking remedial actions.

Bovis has agreed to the development of a comprehensive standpipe, smoking prevention, fire prevention and first responder safety program at 130 Liberty Street and all other Bovis New York projects.

Bovis has also agreed to a program of management and staff changes to enhance its commitment to fire safety, including hiring a “Senior Fire Safety Manager,” approved by the District Attorney and reporting directly to the CEO of Bovis, to oversee fire safety on all Bovis New York projects, hiring a new Regional Safety Director, assigning executive responsibility for direct supervision of New York operations including safety, to the COO of Bovis, and terminating the employment of those responsible for Bovis’ failures at the Deutsche Bank building.

Bovis has also agreed to the appointment of an independent monitor, approved by the District Attorney and paid for by Bovis, to oversee the implementation and effectiveness of Bovis safety initiatives, as well as the integrity in the hiring of Bovis subcontractors and Bovis’ compliance with all other terms of this Agreement for five years. The Monitor will prepare semi-annual reports of its findings and submit them to the District Attorney.

Bovis will also establish a Fire Safety Academy under the auspices of Contractors Association of Greater New York (“CAGNY”), or a similar industry group approved by the District Attorney and in collaboration with the New York City Fire Department, for the training of New York City construction industry personnel and for the research and development of fire safety initiatives, with a funding from Bovis of two million dollars ($2,000,000). Bovis has agreed that this sum will not be taken as a tax deduction of any kind or paid for through insurance.

Finally, Bovis has agreed to the establishment of a memorial fund in the amount of ten million dollars, consisting of five million dollars for each of the families of the two deceased firefighters. Bovis has agreed that the payment to this memorial fund will be exclusive of, will not affect and will not be used as a set-off against any civil liability that Bovis may incur as a result of lawsuits filed with respect to the fire. Bovis has also agreed that any payment to this memorial fund will not be taken as a tax deduction of any kind or paid for through insurance.

All defendants face two counts of Manslaughter in the Second Degree, a class C felony, is punishable by 5 to 15 years in prison; two counts of Criminally Negligent Homicide, a class E felony, is punishable by 1 ⅓ to 4 years in prison; and one count of Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree, a class A misdemeanor, is punishable by 1 year in jail.

Mr. Morgenthau thanked the New York City Fire Department, specifically Robert Byrnes, Chief Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Investigation; David Lynn, Assistant Chief Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Investigation; Dennis Quincy, Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Investigation; and Dan Caruso, Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Investigation. Mr. Morgenthau also thanked the City of New York City Department of Investigation, specifically Rose Gill Hearn, Commissioner; John Kantor, Associate Commissioner; Jayme Naberezny, Inspector General; and Dennis Curran, Special Inspector General. Mr. Morgenthau also thanked the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, specifically Robert Joyce, Special Investigator, Office of the Inspector General for the Port Authority.

Assistant District Attorneys Brian J. Fields and Noah D. Genel, both of whom are assigned to the Rackets Bureau, are handling the prosecution of this case under the supervision of Eric Seidel, Chief of the Rackets Bureau and Patrick J. Dugan, Chief of the Investigation Division. Investigators Gerald Bergold and Farryl Sverd also worked on the investigation, under the supervision of Investigation Bureau Chief Joseph Pennisi.

Taken from:

Manhattanda.org

[JBE 328]

Now that this is out, I wonder if any heads are going to roll from FDNY Brass...

[M' Ave 1,466]

They should.....

......there are shortcomings on a lot of fronts here.

There really is no excuse for the lack of inspections, but how can the local Co. be in service if they'd have to be decontaminated prior to responding to an alarm during a BI period?