NIOSH LODD Report

[Guest]

NIOSH Report

This is an interesting NIOSH report on the death of a D/C in a combination department. It contains vivid pictures on fire attacking lightweight construction. It discusses quite clearly the risks that lightweight construction bring to firefighters. It contains an excellent discussion on the importance of company accountability, the proper use of PPV, the need for RIT (and waiting for two-in-two-out to be established), specialized RIT training to be able to remove a downed firefighter, and a bit on firefighter survival.

And, lastly, it really hits home the idea of not taking unneccessary risks to extinguish fires. I think that this can be a great training tool.

[hudson144 150]

A STRONG POINT#8- To use the TIC as a tool to locate the heat source or fire, as mentioned earlier in the year i believe back in march at least 3 fatalities were from the first hoseline crews falling through the floors. If you have the TIC you can see what is above you, below you,ifo you etc. This is a valuable tool when attacking fires. Its a shame that many depts. do not include the TIC on the first line in. In this case as well as the others floor failure could have been recognized because you would have been able to see high heat/fire burning through the floor. In the other cases the members did not realize that a basement fire was present, same thing happened-floor failure with the members going into the basement. Think about the old booby trapped structures where the floors were cut out. this still exists maybe not as much as back in the 70s but they are still out there. Alot of us can learn from these tragic situations and hopefully change your SOP's to keep the worst from happening.b safe! jjc

[ltjay157 10]

After reading the report, the one thing I can't figure out is why they still went inside after seeing a hole in the floor. If i see that during a fire, I will immediately back out and inform the IC of the situation. The resident(s) were not home so there were no victims. Houses can always be replaced, firefighters cannot.

The volunteer Captain who arrived on E-402 (Captain #1) declared initial incident command (IC). The victim and IC conversed briefly and decided to make entry through the front door with a 1 3/4” pre-connected hand line charged by a compressed air foam system (CAFS) for search/rescue and to search for the seat of the fire. (Note: the pump operator (Captain # 1) noted that they were using 60gpm/60cfm class “A” foam at 125psi). The IC also served as pump operator. After going on air, the victim and FF#1 (the entry team) entered the structure through the front door (A-side) entrance at approximately 1442 hours, noting that a section of the floor just to the left of the front door had already given way. Once inside to the right approximately 6 feet, the team realized the floor under them was very hot and “spongy.” At the same time, the conditions inside the structure became untenable, with intensifying heat and “zero visibility” as a result of thick, black smoke. Within 30-45 seconds of making entry, the victim informed FF#1 that they were going to evacuate to get a light. As they exited the structure, they pulled the hose line out with them. The victim stayed at the front entrance with the nozzle and sent FF#1 to E-402 to retrieve a box light and to pull another pre-connect. (Note: at this point, team integrity was compromised leaving one fire fighter operating alone in close proximity to the fire.) After retrieving the light, the victim instructed FF#1 to stretch the additional line around to the B-side to hit the fire in the basement through a window (Note: the basement window led to a crawl space, so no water actually hit the basement, or the fire). Also, during this time, FF#2 set up a positive pressure ventilation (PPV) fan at the entrance on side A.The victim stayed at the front entrance (alone a second time) to reportedly attack the fire through the hole in the floor just to the left of the entrance (see Photo 2 and Figure 2).

[Guest]

You wonder if tunnel vision was involved. Also interesting is the fact that no one questioned any of the decisions that led up to the death. Things that immediately come to my mind are:

1. Multi-tasking the IC so that his attention was divided. Also, no mention of the IC doing a 360.

2. Not having any back up crew (RIT) or back up line in place.

3. Using PPV to intensify the fire that they hadn't even gotten access to.

4. And, the big one - attempting to do an interior attack knowing that the floor was compromised. Again with no backup in place. And, knowing that there was a delayed notification of the fire and a delayed response by the FD. I also assume that they should have suspected the use of lightweight construction. Given the delay in responding, you really have to think twice about doing an interior attack as you can assume that the fire has gotten into the void spaces. You know it has if there is a hole in the floor and other parts of the floor felt spongy.