Catastrophic Multiple-Death Fires for 2006

[RWC130 594]

Catastrophic Multiple-Death Fires for 2006

NFPA Journal®, September/October 2007

By Stephen G. Badger

For the second year in a row, the largest loss of life in a multiple-death fire occurred in a vehicle fire. In 2006, 24 aircraft passengers died of burns or smoke inhalation following an aircraft crash in Kentucky.

In 2005, 23 people lost their lives when a bus carrying hurricane evacuees from a nursing home caught fire on a Texas interstate highway.

In August 2006, an early morning flight from Lexington, Kentucky, to Atlanta, Georgia, was preparing for takeoff. The aircraft, a 54-seat, two-engine turbo jet with 3 crew members and 47 passengers on board was cleared to take off on one runway, but instead taxied onto another runway, which was approximately 3,500 feet (1,067 meters) shorter. The aircraft attempted to take off, but was still on the ground when it reached the end of the runway, and crashed into a fence and trees.

The shattered aircraft came to rest in a field about 1,800 feet (549 meters) from the end of the runway and caught fire. The first-arriving emergency responders were able to assist the co-pilot from a window and to safety. He was in critical condition, but has survived. The other 2 crew members and all the passengers perished. Twenty-four deaths were fire-related. Ten died of thermal injuries, and 14 died of smoke and products of combustion inhalation. The remaining 25 died of multiple blunt force trauma.

After the aircraft was cleared for takeoff, the air traffic controller, who was working alone, turned around to perform other duties. He heard a noise, saw a fire, and notified the fire department of the emergency within seconds on the tower crash phone. A complete report of this incident is available from the National Transportation Safety Board.

This incident was just 1 of 36 catastrophic multiple-death fires in 2006 that killed 223 people, 6 of whom were firefighters and 28 children under the age of 6. This is in contrast to 2005, when there were 20 such fires that killed 134 people, 23 of whom were children under age 6. A “catastrophic multiple-death fire” is one that kills 5 or more people in residential properties or kills 3 or more people in nonresidential and nonstructural properties.

In the last 10 years (1997-2006), 1 fire has been the deadliest fire of the year in 8 years, and in the other 2 years, 2 fires have had equal death tolls greater than those in any other fire. Vehicles accounted for the deadliest fire of the year in 3 years (2 aircraft and a bus) and one of the deadliest fires (a multi-vehicle highway crash fire) in one of the 2 years with a tie. Homes accounted for the deadliest fire of the year in 2 years (a dwelling and an apartment building) and one of the deadliest fires (a duplex and a manufactured home) in both of the years with a tie. All other properties accounted for the deadliest fires in only 3 years (the World Trade Center attack, the Station Night Club fire, and a board and care home) and one of the deadliest fires (a jail) in one of the 2 years were the same.

Homes and vehicles consistently account for most of the fire deaths in the U.S. It is worth remembering that they also often account for the deadliest fires as well.

The 36 catastrophic multiple-death fires in 2006, accounting for 223 deaths, were both slightly above the recent 10-year average of 35 fires and 206 deaths.

In the U.S. in 2006, there were an estimated 1,642,500 fires (412,500 in residential properties, 111,500 in nonresidential, and 1,118,500 in nonstructural properties). There were an estimated 3,245 civilian deaths (2,620 in residential properties, 85 in non-residential, and 540 in nonstructural properties)1. The catastrophic multiple-death fires accounted for .002 percent of these fires and 6.9 percent of the deaths.

Catastrophic residential fires

The largest number of catastrophic multiple-death fires (18) occurred in residential structures. Of these 18 residential fires, 15 involved single-family dwellings (5 of which were manufactured homes), 2 involved apartment buildings (one a 4-unit and one a 12-unit building), and one involved a 104-unit residential hotel. These 18 fires accounted for half the catastrophic multiple-death fires in 2006, 5 fires more than in 2005. In these residential structure fires, there were 106 deaths—almost half the deaths in catastrophic multiple-death fires 2006, and 26 more than in 2005. The deaths of 25 children under age 6, up 2 from 2005, accounted for almost one-quarter of the residential catastrophic multiple-fire deaths in 2006.

Seventeen of the 18 fires occurred between the hours of 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. Ninety-four of the deaths occurred during this time period. All the children under age 6 died during this time period. (See table 1 for details on these fires .)

The largest loss-of-life residential fire killed 12 people. The fire occurred in a 4-story (I believe we categorized this as just a four-story building), 104-room residential hotel that had complete coverage smoke alarms, smoke detection, and manual pull stations. In the second story hallway, numerous box springs and mattresses were stored as they were removed and replaced in the rooms. During the evening, an argument ensued between two second-story occupants. Shortly after that, one of the participants in the argument took a mattress and placed it in front of the door of the other person. She set the mattress on fire and returned to her room. Fire and heat spread rapidly until the hallway flashed over. Smoke and fire spread rapidly throughout most of the building. The smoke detector in the area of ignition activated and notified a central station alarm company, which in turn notified the fire department. The 12 victims were located in various areas of the U-shaped structure—6 on the second story, 4 on the third story, and 2 on the fourth story. Two people involved in the argument survived. The woman who set the fire was arrested and convicted.2

The second largest fire killed 9 people, 4 of them under 6. The fire occurred in a two-story, single-family dwelling of unprotected wood-frame construction that had no smoke alarms. Arcing electrical equipment ignited combustibles in the ceiling/attic area above a second-story bedroom. Something woke a resident asleep on the first story. He heard screams from the second story, and he made several unsuccessful rescue attempts before he escaped unharmed.

The third fire killed seven people, one of them a child under age 6. The building was a one-story, single-family dwelling of unprotected wood-frame construction with no smoke alarms. Very little information was reported other than that the fire occurred when an overheated refrigerator motor ignited nearby combustibles.

Three fires killed six people each. The first fire was in a one-story, single-family dwelling of unprotected wood-frame construction with no smoke alarms. One victim was under the age of 6. Due to the destruction, the cause and origin could not be determined. Indications are that four victims, two adults and two children, were attempting to escape and were located near the back door. The location of the other two victims was unclear.

The second fire occurred in a two-section manufactured home of unprotected wood-frame construction with no smoke alarms. The family arrived home from a trip to find the power had been shut off the day before. They lit a propane lantern and placed it in a kitchen nook/dining area. The family went to bed and left the lantern unattended. Nearby combustibles ignited, and the fire burned into the bathroom and up above the ceiling throughout the home. There were three 20-pound (9.1 kilogram) propane cylinders and four oxygen bottles inside the home, which contributed to fire spread. The victims were located in various bedrooms.

The third fire broke out in a 12-unit, three-story apartment building of unprotected ordinary construction. There were two victims under age 6. There were no smoke alarms in the apartment where the victims were located, and it was not reported if there were any in the rest of the building. An open flame in contact with clothing in a third-floor apartment hallway caused the fire. It was not reported why the open flame was in use. The fire extended throughout the third-story apartment only.

There were 12 fires that killed five people each. The 12 fires consisted of five dwelling fires (three two-story dwellings, a one-and-a-half-story dwelling, and a one-story dwelling), four manufactured homes, and three apartment buildings (a four-story building, a three-story row house, and a two-story row house). In several of the buildings with more than one story, fire trapped some victims on upper floors after beginning on the ground floor.

Six of the twelve fires began in a living room, family room, den, or front room. Three fires began in an unreported area, and the other three began in a computer room, a crawl space, and a porch.

Two of the fires cited unusual complicating factors that point to important safety lessons:

Trying to fight fire using water from a sink;

Only one egress door available; and

Candles used for lighting because power had been shut off before fire.

Catastrophic nonresidential fires

There were seven nonresidential catastrophic multiple-death fires in 2006, which resulted in 42 deaths, compared to two in 2005, which resulted in 18 deaths. Two of the seven fires occurred in coal mines and one each in a 19-bedroom residential care facility, a religious social hall, a dwelling under construction, a warehouse, and an oil storage tank facility. (See Table 2 for details on these fires .)

The largest loss-of-life incident in this category was an explosion that killed 12 coal miners. Lightning struck a cable a distance from the coal mine, followed it in, and caused a methane explosion. There was no detection or suppression equipment in place in the mine. One miner was killed in the explosion. Twelve others survived the explosion and sought refuge behind a barricade curtain they built to keep out the deadly fumes. Approximately 41 hours after the explosion, rescuers located one survivor and the bodies of the other eleven miners two miles (3.2 kilometers) into the mine. A report on the incident is available on the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) Web site (www.msha.gov).

The second fire was in a one-story, 19-bedroom residential care facility of unprotected ordinary construction. Eleven people died in this fire, including ten residents and one caregiver. There were smoke alarms in the common areas, and three manual pull stations but only a single horn/strobe in the building. There were no reports of any alarms operating. There was no automatic suppression equipment present.

An electrical malfunction in a common area near the north wall of the structure ignited combustibles. The fire spread to the attic and raced to the south end of the structure. A neighbor reported the fire after seeing flames coming from the roof. Arriving firefighters found heavy fire from the roof and numerous casualties. At first, firefighters were able to enter the building, but they were forced out by smoke and fire conditions. At least 24 other residents were injured, many of them removed before the fire department arrived3. Since this incident, the state has required sprinklers in group homes and nursing homes.

The third incident was another methane explosion in a coal mine. This explosion killed five miners—two as a result of the blast and three due to inhalation of smoke and soot. There was no detection or suppression equipment in use. A portable methane detector was present but was not in use. Miners were cutting a metal roof strap with an acetylene torch. The torch ignited methane that leaked around a seal leading to an unused section of the mine. A report on the incident is available on the MSHA Web site.

Two fires killed four people each. The first occurred at a single-family house under construction. Due to pending legal actions, the fire department could not release any details on the incident.

The other occurred in a three-story building of unprotected wood-frame construction with a social hall on the ground floor. There were four apartments on the second and third stories, three of which were occupied. There were smoke alarms in the apartments, but none on the ground floor. There was no suppression equipment in the building. At the time of the fire, there were 24 to 30 occupants in the hall and kitchen area on the ground floor, preparing for a religious festival.

There was a 350-square-foot (32.5-square-meter) religious shrine constructed of wood and paper in a large open meeting room on the ground floor. Candles floated in pans of water on the shrine. When someone attempted to light a candle, the head of the match broke and landed in paper decorations. The shrine soon became involved and the fire spread rapidly.

The fire was between the exits and the kitchen area where the victims were working, trapping them. Investigators found several code violations, but they did not directly cause the deaths. Ten other people were injured.

Two fires killed three persons each. The first occurred in a crude-oil storage tank. There was no detection or suppression equipment. Welders were working on top of one tank in a series of crude oil tanks connected by a pipeline. The tank being welded had been purged, but the others had not. The connecting pipe had been disconnected near the tank and left open ended and not capped. A torch ignited vapors escaping the uncapped pipe. The fire flashed into the tank being worked on and the tank next to it. The workers were thrown off the roof by the resulting explosion.

The second incident was an explosion in a 60,000-square-foot (5574-square-meter) one-story warehouse of protected non-combustible construction. There was no automatic detection equipment. No information on suppression equipment was reported. The explosion and fire resulted in complete devastation over the 10-acre (4.4-hectare) site. The cause of this massive explosion and ensuing fire is still under investigation. Along with the 3 fatalities, at least 40 other workers were injured.

Catastrophic nonstructural fires

There were 11 nonstructural catastrophic multiple-death fires in 2006, killing 75 people, or a third of the deaths in catastrophic multiple-death incidents. The fires occurred in nine vehicle incidents—five involving highway vehicles, three involving aircraft, and one involving a tugboat, barges, and a pipeline—as well as two wildland fires. (See Table 3 for details on these fires .)

A medical examiner or coroner verified that the deaths in the vehicle crashes and fires were due to inhalation of products of combustion or thermal injuries, not impact.

The largest loss-of-life in an incident in this category was 24 in the aircraft crash and fire discussed earlier.

One wildland incident killed 12 people. This was a wildland complex that encompassed two large fires and six smaller ones. This incident occurred during drought condition where the area had no rainfall for 11 months. A downed power line caused the fire, which burned 907,245 acres (367,149 hectares) and destroyed 89 structures, including nine homes, five vehicles, 1,040 electric poles, 2,000 miles (3,219 kilometers) of fence, and 4,296 head of cattle.

The deaths occurred in various locations. A firefighter was killed when his fire apparatus overturned while he was responding to one of the fires in the complex. Four people died in a nine-vehicle collision on a smoke-shrouded highway. Visibility was down to zero when one vehicle stopped and caused the chain reaction crash. Four more died when their car ran off the road and fire overran them when they were fleeing. Three people died in their homes as they were preparing to evacuate.

One fire killed six people. This incident occurred as a tugboat pushed two barges about 1½ to two miles (2.4 to 3.2 kilometers) off shore. The aft spud, a five-ton (4,535.9-kilogram) steel shaft used as a mooring device on one of the barges, released from a fully upright position on the barge, fell into the shallow water, and struck a submerged natural gas pipeline. The release of gas ignited in a fireball that engulfed the vessels. Two people survived the fire. The United States Coast Guard and NTSB are investigating.

Four fires killed five people each. This first fire occurred on an interstate as a two-vehicle crash and fire. One child under age 6 died in this fire. A pickup truck was rear ended by an 18-wheel semi-tractor trailer and both vehicles ended up off the side of the highway. Sparks ignited spilled fuel. The seven occupants in the pickup died: three due to burns, two due to smoke inhalation, and two due to blunt force trauma.

The second fire had no information reported other than it was a two-vehicle crash and fire; with one victim under age 6.

The third fire occurred when a small single-engine aircraft struck a manufactured home, then crashed and burned in a cornfield. One child under age 6 was among the victims. The plane was performing a touch-and-go-around when its engine stalled. The plane struck the home, then crashed in a field, killing all five on board the aircraft. No one on the ground or in the home was killed.

The fourth one was a wildland fire that killed five firefighters. This incendiary fire was set on a day that had Santa Ana wind conditions with gusts of up to 50 mph (80.5 kmph) and relative humidity of between 5 and 10 percent. The blaze burned over 40,000 acres (16,187.4 hectares) and destroyed 34 homes and 20 outbuildings. The firefighters died as they were protecting a home in the path of the fire. The fire overran and trapped them.4

There was one crash and fire that killed four people. This occurred when a small aircraft crashed on a mountain at the 2,070-foot (631-meter) elevation mark. The cause of the crash has not been determined yet. The NTSB is investigating.

There were three vehicle crashes and fires that killed three people each. Two were single-vehicle crashes. One ran off the road and into a tree and one hit a barrier and overturned. The third was a multi-vehicle crash and fire on an interstate highway. In all cases, victims were trapped in the wreckage and engulfed by the fire.

Role of smoke alarms and sprinklers

Information on detection equipment was reported for 14 of the 18 residential fires. Six properties had detection equipment present—one had complete coverage, two had partial coverage, and the coverage of three was unknown. Two systems operated properly, yet there were 17 deaths in these fires. One of these two fires flashed over in a hallway and rapidly filled the building with fire and thick smoke. No reason for detector ineffectiveness was reported in the second fire. In one of the remaining four properties, there were two detectors found—one operated, and the other was missing a battery. Two properties had equipment that didn’t operate because both were missing their batteries. The operation of the equipment in the sixth property was unknown or not reported.

Eight properties had no detection equipment. They accounted for 49 deaths (11 children under age 6).

Information on detection equipment was reported for 6 of the non-residential properties. Two properties had detection equipment. Both had only partial coverage, and the operation of both was unknown. In one case they were known not to have had coverage in the area of the fire and the deaths, which explains the failure to operate. Four non-residential properties had no detection equipment, and these fires accounted for 23 deaths. Detector presence in one non-residential property was not reported or unknown.

None of the 18 residential and none of the 5 of 7 non-residential properties that reported information had sprinklers.

Smoke alarms have been proven effective in reducing the risk of death in home fires. The most effective arrangement is to use interconnected multiple-station smoke alarms that are supplied by hard-wired AC power, with a battery backup. These should be located outside each sleeping area, on each level, and in each bedroom. Homeowners should routinely test smoke alarms according to manufacturers’ recommendations. NFPA recommends testing residential smoke alarms at least monthly. Batteries should also be replaced according to manufacturer’s recommendations but at least yearly.

Smoke alarms are only effective if occupants exit the building when they sound.

Children should be familiar with the sound of a properly operating smoke alarm. They should follow a practiced escape plan that emphasizes two exits with a designated meeting place.

Exit drills in the home are part of many school curricula. Practicing the plan helps families determine if children and others readily waken to the sound of a smoke alarm, and that, along with assistance for family members who require it, can be factored into the plan. Practicing fire prevention principles could have prevented many of the fires.

Where we get our data

NFPA obtains its data by reviewing national and local news media, including fire service publications. A news clipping service reads all daily U.S. newspapers and notifies the NFPA Fire Analysis and Research Division of catastrophic fires. Once an incident has been identified, we request information from the local fire department or the agency having jurisdiction. NFPA’s annual survey of U.S. fire experience and mailings to state fire marshals are additional data sources, although not principal ones. We also contact federal agencies that have participated in the investigation of such fires. The diversity and redundancy of these sources enable us to collect the most complete data available on catastrophic fires in the U.S. We understand that in many cases, due to ongoing litigation, a department cannot release information. Also, in some cases departments have been unable to determine the information we request.

Acknowledgments

NFPA wishes to thank the U.S. Fire Service and the medical examiners for their contributions of data, without which this report would not be possible. The author would like to give a special thanks to Norma Candeloro and to his co-workers for their guidance in the completion of this report.

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Stephen G. Badger is fire data assistant in NFPA’s Fire Analysis and Research Division and is retired from the Quincy, Massachusetts, Fire Department.

Endnotes

Michael Karter, “Fire Loss in the United States During 2006,” NFPA Journal, September/October 2007.

Bob Duval, NFPA Investigation Report, “The Reno Hotel Fire.”

Bob Duval, NFPA Investigation Report, “The Anderson Board and Care Fire.”

Rita F. Fahy, Paul R. LeBlanc, Joseph Molis. “Firefighter Fatalities in the United States 2006,” NFPA Journal, July/August 2007.

CREDIT: NFPA http://www.nfpa.org/publicJournalDetail.as...src=NFPAJournal

[JetPhoto 626]

Good story, thanks for posting. It's very sad that so much death had occured in 2006.

[RWC130 594]

FIRE PREVENTION WEEK

October 7-13

2007