Firefighter - Back To Basics

[RWC130 594]

Firefighter - Back To Basics

Dupes of Complacency Head Back to Basics

By John Linstrom

In the past months, five Southern California firefighters have died and two were seriously burned in two separate fires. Although the fires themselves were unrelated, are the heartbreaking outcomes a symptom of a deeper problem?

 

While the jury is still investigating the cause and origin of both events and compiling the facts and probabilities that led to these unacceptable outcomes, my anger and impulsiveness lead me to look for root problems. I'm not assigning blame or criticizing the actions that were taken on either of these fires. My attempt and goal is to somehow use these recent events to derive some benefit out of tragedy. I am not speculating on the cause and contributing factors, as I am not officially involved in either of these fires. But as a career practitioner and an observer of our profession for the past 30 years, I do feel compelled to make some general observations that might be applicable to all departments.

Complacency is something that is as fierce an enemy to firefighters as fire itself. It is relentless. It follows the path of least resistance, and firefighters must wage a daily battle to keep from being devoured by it. Every time we dodge the bullet and survive an interior attack with two three-person crews, and every time we bypass the passport system on our rig and disregard the riding list or change the visible numbers on our helmets with no one getting lost at a fire scene, we have succumbed to complacency.

When we initiate a fire attack with no rapid intervention crew in place, with no ventilation crew ready to go to work and no one standing out front commanding the event, and no one gets hurt, we have again dodged the bullet. We mistakenly file that play in our mental playbook to be used again, alongside the tried-and-true plays we have learned, practiced and drilled on. After a while, we can't tell them apart. We have been permanently duped by complacency. Complacency doesn't arrive one day in your company and announce itself; it creeps in and takes up residence in all your emergency activities until it is part of normal, accepted operations.

In addition to the dangers of complacency, many responders lack focus and appreciation for the basics. You remember the basics, right? They're the absolutes of firefighting that we were taught and lived by on every fire call. Here are a few examples:

-Always ventilate to prevent flashover.

-Always have a backup line charged and ready before entry.

-Make sure the two-in/two-out crews are in place on all structural fires.

-Don't sacrifice firefighters for property.

Are these still basic tenets of our operations and decision-making? How many of us stood up at our rookie badge-pinning ceremony and said, “I'll commit to living with 50% third-degree burns to protect some stranger's stuff?” We have lost our way somewhere. The idea that we will commit nine or 10 of our workers in an untenable situation where no one could have survived and get them hurt or killed just doesn't make any sense. But we are doing it all over the country each and every day. If we truly subscribe to “Everyone Goes Home,” then we need to revisit the basics and enforce what and how we operate on these hazardous events.

Here are some of the issues that get wrapped around the axle when we chief officers flip-flop our stance. Our company officers use bad judgment and indiscretion, and we wonder why the unacceptable outcomes have become common.

Correct Strategy

Taking an offensive position on a defensive fire will hurt you. It's an honorable and wise incident commander who orders a defensive attack when the only things of value at risk on the fireground are the department's own personnel. It's never acceptable to risk life and limb to save property when no lives are threatened.

Fire Behavior

We need to go back to school to remember how to assess fire behavior in both wildland and structural situations. The color, shape, quality, pressure, volume and temperature of the fire and smoke will scream information if you stop reacting to the emergency and take the time to perform a scientific assessment, or size-up, of what the fire and building are trying to tell you.

For example, the smoke conditions often will tell you whether this is a defensive or offensive fire. They also will tell you whether ventilation should be the first priority. The assessment of fuels should dictate the amount and location of lines, nozzle pattern and extinguishing agent. There are training programs that use models and systems to improve proficiency at these basic skills. If your department doesn't run many working fires, get some help from someone who does and develop a training program for your teams.

Staffing

Firefighter staffing for working structural fires is below recommended levels in nearly every fire department in the country. It's ironic that as our communities have grown, and as our contents have become more volatile and our building materials less substantial and more prone to failure, we have reduced or poorly maintained staffing levels. The days of responding with a 14-person first-alarm assignment are long gone in all but the largest departments. The idea that we can meet strategic and statutory objectives with a nine-person one-alarm assignment would be laughable if it weren't so tragic.

How does anyone meet OSHA CFR 1910.120, NFPA 1581, NIOSH best practices, rapid-intervention coverage and state mandates with everyone working a dual role? The medics are firefighters but are delayed due to an EMS run, the battalion chiefs were taken off shift to manage a division or bureau and are responding late from home, the dedicated truck company is unstaffed/cross-manned or on second alarm only (or after a recall or paid-on-call), and the third or fourth engine on the assignment is now dedicated to rapid intervention and can't be assigned to critical suppression functions. Does this sound like your department?

Fire chiefs have a moral and ethical responsibility to either acquire the right resources or lower community expectations. You can't gamble with the lives of your personnel for political expediency. I know the board or council or commission doesn't want to hear it, but if it's the truth, work with the labor organization to make a case for how you plan on modifying operations with a total arriving allocation of six, 10 or 12 personnel. Continuing to operate aggressively at structural fires with inadequate staffing is like playing Russian roulette with your personnel.

Tactical Priorities

Lloyd Layman's RECEO tactical priority model rescue, exposures, contain, extinguish, overhaul belonged to your grandfather and your father. But that was when a 2-by-4 was truly 2 inches by 4 inches, and cut-and-stack framing existed. It was also when things inside the structure were made of normal combustibles that contributed to an ordinary fuel load.

Layman's RECEO-vs argued that ventilation and salvage could be added where needed. However, the heat generated by today's confined interior fires demands early ventilation prior to fire attack, period. The coordinated vertical ventilation that we learned in our Firefighter I academy is what we should be seeing in the field on every working structural fire. If vertical ventilation isn't an option, then a coordinated, horizontal ventilation opening should be made and supported by positive-pressure ventilation where appropriate.

A lot of fire officers complain that without a responding truck company, it's too dangerous to send an engine company on the roof. Well, if it's too dangerous to be above the fire, it's too dangerous to be crawling on your hands and knees in heavy heat and zero visibility toward the fire, as well. The REVAS Model presented in Fire Attack says that we rescue, cover exposures, ventilate, attack and salvage, every time!

So what's the action plan to prevent these horrendous and unacceptable outcomes in your department? First, refocus training and go back to the basics. Look at how to perform size-up by reading smoke and reviewing the factors that drive the selection of proper fireground strategy and tactics. Reward good, safe behavior and immediately confront shortcuts and complacent behavior. Inaction by a chief or company officer is tacit approval, and your troops will file the unsafe tactic right next to the proper method if you don't intervene. Show some leadership and confront the unsafe and insane procedures that are going on in many of today's departments.

The best rapid intervention program is abstinence you never need to deploy it because everyone operates in a safe and accountable fashion. If we take the time to do size-up; establish strong visible command by a competent commander; and open up the building for the engine companies with ventilation, escape routes and extension checks, we will not have lost, trapped or missing personnel. We would rarely deploy a rapid intervention team from the on-deck or standby location.

Desperate times call for desperate measures. Instead of a big safety stand-down every year, consider suspending all of the “sexy” training for an entire quarter. Forget about confined-space rescue, trench rescue, extrication, bloodborne pathogens and pandemic influenza. Focus on what's killing and disfiguring our brothers and sisters: interior attack, lack of command, lack of accountability, inability to assess fire behavior, and responding and returning. Going back to the basics and slowing down before committing to an offensive position might save some lives and minimize suffering in our families.

Training is a tool to change behavior. When firefighters continue to get injured and killed, we need to look at training, policy, staffing and equipment. If these are all in place, a department may have a complacency problem or a culture where rules just aren't enforced.

Standardization of expected actions and outcomes, as well as the prevention of complacency, is a leadership function. Note that I didn't say it was a management function. If all personnel lead by example and correct minor flaws when they observe them, they can positively affect safety and level the playing field on many hazardous occasions. Many of you are already there, and I applaud your efforts. For the rest of us, let's get busy and correct those mistakes to reinforce our safety culture.

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John Linstrom is executive director of The Linco Group, an emergency services consultancy. He's an adjunct faculty member for Texas A&M University and the National Fire Academy. Linstrom currently serves as a reserve battalion chief in Apple Valley, Calif. He also serves as commander of the DHS/FEMA DMORT for Region IX and has been involved in the national USAR program since 1996.

CREDIT: WWW.FIRECHIEF.COM