FireMedic049

I can understand not liking the TQC based on the perception that using it reduces overall manpower and in-service companies. I can also understand not liking it because of the compromise that can occur with the apparatus vs regular engine/truck deployment. However, there's some things to think about when looking at the use or suggested use of TQC. What's the alternative option? I'm not sure what happened in St. Louis, but I know when Richmond went TQC there was a reduction of companies and overall size of the department. There was a lot of grumbling over the change and all, particularly the view that using quints made what was lost "expendable". This could certainly be true, but what would've happened if they didn't make the change? If the goal was to reduce costs, then it's likely that a force reduction could have happened anyway. So, if you eliminate some personnel, then you either reduce company size or eliminate companies. Let's say you have 20 engines and 5 trucks operating from 20 stations and have to eliminate 5 companies. Do you close a truck or two? Do you eliminate 5 engines and close 3 stations while also reducing 2 of the engine/truck houses to just the truck and leave the those 2 districts without a suppression capable apparatus? Do you close 5 companies, convert the rest to quints and keep all the stations open while retaining suppression capabilities in all stations and adding 15 aerial devices to your arsenal? What's the best option if you are losing the positions anyway? Cross staffing isn't quite the same as using a Quint. It is in the sense you refer to, but one of the main areas in which it can certainly cause a problem is when that manpower will not be responding from the station. If the crew on-duty is returning from a call, out doing an inspection, training or whatever, the quint allows them to immediately respond and act in either role. However, if they took the engine and the next call is for the truck what do you do? It's generally not very practical to return to the station to switch apparatus. Your idea is certainly valid, but has some distinct drawbacks compared to the duty crews using quints.

Not really. You seem to be making the common mistake when discussing the "QUINT system" (AKA "Total Quint Concept", TQC). In a TQC type of deployment, the Quint is typically deployed as either an "engine" or as a "truck", not both. When doing such, manpower wise, a 4 FF quint is no different than a 4 FF engine or 4 FF truck. Obviously, additional staffing would increase a single unit's ability to do multiple tasks regardless of what type of unit it is. The bigger issue for the system to work well is having firefighters who are trained in both disciplines, good SOPs and operations that clearly define what each unit's role will be on a call and good officers who will ensure that their unit will perform whatever role assigned.

So, you state the problem is you have a crew, but no driver among the volunteers, correct? Uhhhhm, maybe you should train some of those crew members to be drivers?

Thanks.

Thanks, but that didn't quite clear things up. Were you trying to say that an Engine Company with a "5th FF" is a 5-person company?

Just for clarification because I've read conflicting and sometimes confusing things regarding this, is the "5th FF" actually the 5th person in a 5-person company or are they the 5th firefighter in a 6-person company (5 FFs & 1 Officer)?

Sorry, but your counter argument is flawed too. A college education in many occupations does equate to being "better". Doctor, Lawyer, Accountant & Engineer are a few that come to mind right away. You are right that a college education may not make someone a "better" firefighter or company officer no matter how long they spend in school. However, the converse can also be true. Some people, no matter how great a firefighter/company officer or how long as one will automatically make them a "better" Fire Chief. They may be prepared to lead a scene or be able to make other operational type decisions, but 20+ years on the front lines may not prepare them for the rest of the job, like preparing budgets, directly dealing with city officials, writing grant proposals, preparing and delivering presentations to acquire additional or protect current department resources,etc. I think there's a legitimate argument for a Fire Chief to have some degree of college level education.

It's more than just "one". There are many graduates of that course out there.

Who exactly is the "employer" for the "Long Ridge Paid Drivers Association"? It would seem that it would be the fire company itself since they are being sued for the wages. So how are they getting around federal labor laws prohibiting volunteering for your employer if they are serving as volunteer officers in that same department?

Out of curiosity, what would that BS be?

Considering that you likely have very few structural fires each year, you likely don't have a true need for the "high end" fabrics which tend to be a little pricey, but certainly worth the money for departments with high fire duty. I would suggest using the outer shell fabric known as "Advance". It's a blend of Nomex and Kevlar. Overall, it performs better than the regular Nomex III fabric, but isn't significantly more expensive like PBI or Millenia. If you are looking at Globe/Cairns gear, I'd suggest their new Silicone based padded knee option. You can also get the name panels attached with velcro.

Have you ever been to NYC? There's a reason it's been referred to as "The City that never sleeps". The Union typically says that "lives are at risk" because they are. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that if you remove resources from the system, then you will always get a reduced response in some fashion whether that be less units, personnel, increased response time or a combination of these. If you shut down one of the companies at night, then the people in that company's 1st due area clearly have a higher "risk" level since the closest engine company WILL NOT be responding and they will be waiting for one from further away to arrive. When they arrive the fire WILL be bigger than it would have been for the closed company. Bigger fire = more danger to civilians (and FFs for that matter). The City says that the cuts "won't impact operations" because that's what their "handbook" says they are supposed to say to "calm" the masses in these situations.

In the abstract, it's probably true that overall the FDNY uses less resources at 0300 than it does at 1500. However, the fire that occurs at 0300 will likely require the same amount of resources as the one that occurs at 1500. There may be a population shift between night and day, but the number of buildings remains static. As I said earlier, we never know where or when that next fire will break out. That's why the firehouse would still be needed at night even if it's "needed" more during the daytime because of higher call volume during those hours.

And what "business model" do you suggest? I certainly don't disagree that analyzing your operation to see if changes are warranted is appropriate. However, an inherent problem with the "run it like a business" line of thinking is that FD deployment and working conditions are not like most business operations. Probably one of the closest comparables is the food service industry. Typically, a restaurant will have a dynamic plan regarding their operation. Their staffing will typically peak around the "normal" meal times and then shrink back between meal times. This makes sense since you know when your highest demand periods will be each day and you can adjust for it. Now, there will be times when you get an off-peak rush, but you can generally handle it and the main consequence is generally a dining experience that isn't as efficient with the smaller staff. Additionally, if a meal period isn't as busy as predicted, some staff may be sent home early. This type of planning doesn't lend itself well to the fire service. The main problem is the inherent unpredictability of the work and the varying levels of personnel needed to perform that work. You can look at call volume and see that "more" calls occur during the daytime than at night, but you'd be foolish to base staffing on just that. Most calls aren't going to be very labor intensive and require large sums of personnel, however some will and you will need those people in order to effectively and efficiently mitigate that problem. Another problem is that we also don't know where to problem will occur. The restaurant will always know that they will be feeding people in that one location. The fire service doesn't. Like call volume, we can identify areas that have historically had higher requests for service than others, but that doesn't provide enough information for deployment. A large factor in FD deployment is response time. NFPA 1710's standard for the response of the first company is 4 minutes travel time and the full alarm in 8 minutes. If we knew where/when our calls were going to occur and what they would be in advance, then the fire service could reasonably tailor a dynamic deployment plan to match. Unfortunately, that's not possible, so the goal is to be able to provide a somewhat uniform response. So, the inherent problem with closing fire companies at night, rolling brownouts, etc. is not so much with handling call volumes or handling "minor" calls, but rather for "serious" calls like building fires where the "extra" delay because those companies are closed becomes a big factor in terms of fire spread, civilian safety, etc.

You aren't being asked to either of these things. You were asked if the decision was consistent with "normal" practices locally and if the same decision would have been made if it were a volunteer chief. That's not being debated here. The issue I'm discussing is the cancellation of the SFRD supervisor while his units were operating at a scene, NOT any sort of undermining of the IC by SFRD units operating outside of the ICS. I think you missed my point. I think you are confusing the issues. IMO, there's three separate "issues" with the incident in question. 1) A department supervisor's response was cancelled while his units operated at a scene. 2) The Safety Officer "battle". 3) The alleged assault. I'm not advocating that there be more than one "command" on a scene. From the information I've seen so far, none of the three "issues" actually created a situation of "more than one command" at this incident. I see the first as a "safety" issue and therefore not exactly a "legal" order. I see the second as more of a subversion of the ICS than a situation of having two "commands". The third has nothing to do with the ICS. This is true, but there's a difference between not being in agreement with an objective and taking action to disrupt the process. In order to achieve that mutually beneficial outcome, the actions of those whose goal is to undermine have to be acknowledged as inappropriate on that "same side" otherwise it will negatively affect the trust between both sides in the process.

I am being serious. I'm asking you to explain his rationale for doing what he did. I'm asking you to acknowledge that what he did was not common practice and wouldn't have been done if it was a volunteer chief responding. I can't always explain the rationale for the decisions my Deputy Chief (shift boss) makes, but I can tell you that he wouldn't cancel the chief of a mutual aid department while accepting help from their apparatus at a scene. I would venture to say that you are partially correct in that the volunteer FDs have no obligation to adhere to SFRD rules & regs themselves. However, SFRD personnel ARE obligated to follow their own rules & regs. So the SFRD chief officer WOULD be obligated to adhere to HIS department's rules if the expectation is for there to be a SFRD chief officer on the scene of an out of district response. If you accept the suppression units, then you accept the supervisor that goes with it. It's kind of a package deal. In this respect, the volunteer FDs would be obligated to indirectly adhere to SFRD's rules & regs. I don't know, but I'd suppose a lot of it probably has to do with what sounds like an often underperforming volunteer system. No, I'm not implying that the volunteers are the only ones against "working together". I'm saying that you kind of need to get your own house in order if you want to work on "unity" with another. It's disingenuous to "call out" the other side on not stepping up to the plate to "work together" when you have a "loose cannon" on your side and can't even acknowledge that his actions are contrary to what the objectives are. It only serves to undermine the process.

You're right, this isn't really helping that you appear to be refusing to answer some pretty simple, but possibly uncomfortable questions. I think it's pretty obvious that the instigation of this particular incident was the result of prejudicial action that you believe the person had the authority to make. Others certainly disagree with that position. Now this doesn't excuse "the incident" that reportedly took place, but how can you guys "move forward together" if you can't even acknowledge that you have a Chief working against that goal?

But this time they had to be cancelled? So who exactly was recalled in this instance? Did it include ALL SFRD units?

I'm not expecting you to speak for someone else. I would think you'd be able to state whether or not the cancelling of a Chief Officer of a "mutual aid" department operating at a scene is a normal course of action on your incidents. If it is, I don't agree with it, but so be it. If it is not, then it speaks volumes about why it happened in this situation.

The fact that you can't answer that question one way or the other with certainty, IMO just further demonstrates that this was a selective decision. Personally, I find that troubling and contrary to my experiences with those situations. Shouldn't your Chief's primary responsibility be his personnel working an incident?

You appear to be evading the actual question(s). The question(s) were not about the ability of individual companies to return to quarters when the IC cancels or releases them. The question was, and still is, about cancelling ONLY the commanding officer of the department whose units the IC is utilizing on the scene. So when the "recall had been sounded", who was actually "recalled"? From the description of what happened, it appears that there were SFRD units still operating on the scene, so why would the IC specifically cancel their commanding officer? And it all could probably have been avoided if the IC had chosen not to cancel the SFRD Chief. Would he have done the same to YOUR chief?

I absolutely agree that there can only be one IC on a scene, but maybe you can better answer my questions. Leaving out the "incident" that occurred on this specific call..... Would he have cancelled/dismissed YOUR department's fire chief under the same circumstances? Does he have the authority to cancel/dismiss YOUR department's fire chief at a scene in which YOUR department's units are operating?

As an outsider, I can clearly see that was due to a personal animosity. One more question, does he actually have the authority to cancel and/or dismiss from the scene, the supervisor of another departments employees operating at the scene? It's one thing to cancel or release an engine or truck company, but how can he have the authority to accept the help of individual companies from a department, but reject their "boss"?

I just have one comment and one question regarding the cancellation of the SFRD Chief. I think it's completely reasonable for a Chief Officer to respond to an "out of district" call in which his units are operating at. If I read the article right, 21 SFRD personnel were operating at this incident, so it would seem reasonable to have a Chief officer of their own there. Would the IC have made the same decision if it was a Chief Officer of one of the volunteer departments on the call?

Well, to me an obvious thing to learn from this is that you can't use an "everyday" approach to a "once in a decade" event that you have advanced notice of. As for at what point does NYC reach out for help........... Call it a Devil's Advocate thing if you will, but considering the scope of a storm like this, simply calling in Mutual Aid may not be much of an actual solution for a variety of reasons. It's quite possible that the communities being called for assistance may be experiencing an increased call load also and you may be creating a situation where you're "robbing Peter to pay Paul". Additionally, considering the volume of NYC ambulances getting stuck and having problems getting around on the snow covered roads and around the abandoned vehicles, would adding more units from out of town help the situation or compound the problem since it's likely that some of them will have the same problems?