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Your post is a good one. May I just point out that frequently apparatus are placed out of service and replaced with a spare. So if the IC knows his neighboring dept. has a tower ladder and needs one, and requests that specific MA truck company thinking it to be a TL, but gets instead a 100 foot aerial spare rig in it's place; it's a problem. IMHO an IC should NEVER put a FAST/RIT company into any operation other than it's intended mayday rescue assignment; no other work except the stand-by for the emergency, the opening up egress ops, checking exposures, prepping equipment, etc., unless and until another FAST/RIT company is IN PLACE and READY (and not still responding or being toned out). Defeats the whole purpose and emphasis of the importance of having a RIT company ready at all times to go into emergency operation. FAST/RIT might have one minute to make a difference, and it isn't going to be effective if the company is "put to work" while another responds. Too often this is implemented because the staffing is inadequate in the first place to make the fire attack. ~Stay safe

Yell at the cops "what the h@ll are you guys doing entering a potentially IDLH atmosphere without gear?" Then waste the rest of the time as the incident continued to deteriorate arguing over who has jurisdiction over the incident. Chris, you know we all love you, that's why I'm just bustin 'em.

How about a hotmail e-mail? (hmm...hotmail when considered in the context of the fire service suddenly has new meaning.....)

I agree calling a rig WHAT IT IS; is the way to go.

I agree with Seth. An I.C. needs to know that if he is calling for an additional MA truck, and it happens to be equipped with a 1500 gpm Waterous pump; that's important information for the IC in his consideration of apparatus placement on the fireground, and what might be asked of the members of that company to take assignment. I also take issue with Westchester County calling "Ladder Towers"...."Tower Ladders." There is a distinct difference between these two types of apparatus; their lifting capacity, evacuation capability, etc. And once again an IC should have the exact knowledge of what MA help he may be receiving, for all the obvious reasons. C'mon I mean how difficult would it be to revamp a "rig designation" system for goodness sake? But, then again it is Westchester County, New York......

Are you saying the members there are wearing reflective vests underneath their SCBA then? Or do they remove the vest from the turnout coat before donning SCBA....

I haven't read the material you are refering too. However I would say that common sense should be the prevailing factor here. Say you have a car fire or pin job on the highway. All the members involved (including the supervising officers) should be in full turnout gear with SCBA for fires, maybe sans the SCBA for Pins. I think it would be a good idea to have at least a few vests in let's say a command vehicle; so they are available to your Fire Police, or others members the IC might designate to assist PD with traffic issues, and even sometimes fill in for PD if they are busy and not available for your run. ~Stay safe

I did e-mail you Seth, and got a "MAILER DEMON" oooohhh.....Scared the bejesus out of me! Thought you might have taken emtbravo and ran off to Texas with it or something Glad to see you've made it back. PS: Also please disregard my frantic phone call and message on your office phone......

On 9/11 in lower Manhattan the explosions and subsequent collapses of the WTC did major damage to, and disrupted the water supply of the hydrant system. One might think "how in the world could the greatest city in America ever possibly need to pump water from boats onto land, besides dock/ship, or waterfront structure fires?", yet Marine unit/s were employed to supply water quite a distance to be able to power master streams that began to tackle the aftermath of the collapses and the fires that burned for weeks/months. Think about the possibilty of.....say an earthquake in lower Westchester that had the same effect on the Hudson River/Sound Shore communities' water supply systems, then think about the massive fire load and life hazard in these same communities and I'd say you'd have a pretty good reason to not only think about, but also pre-plan for, and be ready for such a contingency. There may be many obstacles that prevent engine companies from directly pumping out of static water supplies, particularly in lower Westchester where this is not the normal SOP, and fireboats could be an absolute neccessity, as proven on 9/11. (much of the information I learned about the immediate actions of the FDNY on 9/11 came from Dennis Smith's "Report from Ground Zero", and first-hand accounts of brothers who were there and survived one or both collapses.)

Edit: The needless exposure to carcinogens came from within the firehouse and inadequate ventilation systems that simply stirred and spread diesel particulate matter up, around and onto all surfaces; including everything in our kitchens, dormitories and day rooms. The members today will never experience this thankfully.

Bill, I often looked at the portrait of your father on our Wall. He and all those other "low shield number" first generation guys starting with Tommy Gorman Shield Number 1, unselfishly gave to us who came later; and the "second generation" of professional firefighters in Eastchester made sure guys like us in the "third generation" knew about it. I truly hope the brothers continue the tradition of remembering who came before them, what they contributed to the improvement of the job; the benefits they fought tooth and nail for, the fight for the succesful creation of the pension system, and the IAFF and it's honored locals, that had to meet in secrecy in the early days. Some guys don't know much about the history of their departments and the brothers that came before them and what they contributed to the job. They should take the time to learn about it, and respect it. Most guys DO know it though, and carefully remember the whos, whats, and wheres. (word is we had a guy that cooked a cat once, but it was during the Great Depression) Some departments don't even recognize the sacrifices the members made personally to ensure their communities were safe. We had a first generation brother pass away as a result of physical injury sustained at a working fire; and to this day the department has never even put up a plaque in his honor (if I missed something and they did it, I apologize). We've had brothers who were way too young pass away from needless exposure to carcinogens. Personally, I'll never forget. ~Stay well

Thanks Chris. I'm still really interested to hear some thoughts about what you brought up earlier: "How to break tunnel vision during training and actual firefighting operations" I think this a worthy direction to take the discussion. I for one think the truck company officer holds a greater responsibility in this specific area. More than likely he/she will be the one monitoring conditions with the TIC, looking over the shoulder of the firefighters under his direct control performing a search, crawling, sweeping for victims. Let your firefighter concentrate on his specific task of search and rescue, and be ready to give the order to retreat if conditions deteriorate. We all know that in a flashover you will die in eight seconds, fully geared and properly protected. The company officer needs to be looking up and around while his members are looking down and over/under objects in the search area, so the warning can be given in time to prevent members becoming trapped in a flash. This holds true for the engine company officer; using the TIC monitoring his members making a push into a fire. The more eyes looking up and around; protecting the members whose job it is to be looking down, the better. Edit: The point I was trying to make is IMHO breaking tunnel vision is a team effort inside the fire building.

First thing guy; the men you are refering to are not "supposed" to be firefighting professionals, they ARE firefighting professionals. Your reference to 8-25 years of experience counts for more than just "something." I have never read a post in here from a TRUE fire professional (career or volunteer) who alluded to "knowing it all." The adaptation and refinement of firefighting techniques has not only been employed by some of these brothers, in many cases they have introduced it, taught it, and implemented it in their departments. To allude to members becoming a "liability, a danger" or "taking a gold watch" because they have taken the time to respond thoughtfully to your postings from their perspective, experience and knowledge; with all of the places and training you claim to have experienced, suprises me and makes me think you are starting to TIP. I think you've made your point about members and departments keeping up to date, reviewing and refining their firefighting practices, and always keeping an open mind about how things in the service can and will constantly change. I also think any member who has offered input into this thread would be very willing to admit the mistakes they have made in the past, and how they learned from those mistakes. Maybe it's time to put it to rest, as I find your comments being prefaced with statements like the one I quoted from you to be slightly offensive to the brothers with the experience and knowledge you may not have, even with your "amazing" amount of worldwide training. Edit: for spelling

A post on the thread about crawling that referenced the Manlius fire got me to thinking about this post. I might have been somewhat robotic in trying to make my point about what the Manlius fire taught us with regard to RIT; I was mostly referencing my recollection of the NIOSH report. I should have added that my statement in no way was meant to cast doubt about the heroic actions of ALL firefighters involved at this fire. I am quite sure there was much anguish, horror and pain at what occured; and I'm also sure that every firefighter involved at this incident did everything and more humanly possible to effect a different outcome. A couple of quick points about the fire (to the best of my recollection): There was a 55 minute delay in notification, and therefore uncontrolled burning in the basement of this truss constructed P/D. The added weight of ceramic tile, appliances (washer/dryer) and the fact that the fire was raging for almost an hour, combined with the weight of two fully geared firefighters added to the load on a truss ready to just drop out. Whatever position they might have been in upon entry might not have made much of a difference unfortunately. The main fire attack was directed at the rear of the structure into the basement, while the entry that proved fatal was above this, as the P/D was 2 1/2 stories from exposure 1, and 3 1/2 stories at exposure 3. I believe the collapse occured on entry into exposure 4. Understaffing was an issue. The Manlius brothers had just performed a truck operation; vertical ventilation, when they were redirected into an engine company operation of advancing a hoseline. I imagine they were already quite physically taxed before they even picked up that attack line. On that note I offer my respect to all firefighters involved in this tragedy.

I don't think anybody is "slamming" you for your opinions, or your experience in other countries. Most are simply disagreeing with you. I would venture to say you've received replies from officers and firefighters with a combined amount of fire experience that adds up to decades if not centuries. As you know, the aggresive interior crawling and searching that occurs in places like Yonkers, FDNY, and most departments in southern Westchester, is done so without the protection of a hoseline by truckies working their way as quickly as possible to the seat of the fire to begin their search outward from that point for fire victims. This is by no means "faith based" (although much praying is done by many members when they are in these situations), rather it is "experience based". It is what has been found to be the most effective way to reach the hot spot and make the grab if possible. If "that's the way we've always done it" continues to work, there is no reason to discard the methodology because it's old. (Edit: Now I'm thinking about Bill's awesome post about the Halligan tool again) Additionally, firefighters in Europe may indeed be very cautious about entering fires. So are American firefighters. But IMHO the tradition of making the calculated risk of putting your @ss on the line to make the grab, and if we in America continue to be more aggresive in our tactics, it is simply one more reason why this is the noblest and most honorable profession in America; putting the life of a potential victim or your brother firefighter ahead of your own. ~Stay safe.

Getting back to the Manlius fire, I remember this one specifically. In Eastchester we had just written and won our first AFG award for RIT equipment and training. When the NIOSH report was released it became quite apparent and rather frustrating that had any RIT tactics been employed at the Manlius fire, the two brothers might have had a chance at life. A hoseline directed into the basement when the truss floor collapsed in the mud-room, a ground or attic ladder being dropped into the basement, or a coordinated effort at rescue, resupply of air; any of these things could have made a difference, and yet none of this occured. We developed a small lecture series based on the NIOSH report, as we began the process of bringing in some really good RIT equipment to the department, and started the long painful process of trying to develop a RIT plan for our understaffed dept. This fire dramatically illustrated the absolute need and importance of the RIT, and occured during one of those watershed type moments for EFD. God rest the brothers, and hopefully the other members of MFD have been able to get through this tragedy. With regard to the court ruling and it's effect on the paperwork side of FDs, I would say get out the paper shredders and start from scratch if that's how it has to be. It's ironic how we fought for SOP/SOGs only to be now told you need to make all the paperwork politcally correct because of lawyers as usual. Edit: Regarding the RIT AFG award I'd like to just extend my personal thanks to Firefighter Joe Pinto, YFD (formerly EFD) for his invaluable help in developing an outstanding award application. The brothers in EFD owe Joey a debt of grattitude for all the effort he put in to helping equip the brothers with the tools they needed to effectively implement RIT.

California is broke, and this rolling brown-out plan will cost lives.

(From Batt. 2) Believe it or not 3 civilians went through this space as L5 was stuck in heavy traffic. Fortunately the tiller man told the chauffeur not to move forward.

Hindsight of course but imagine if the Chauffer saw it going on, put the rig in neutral and revved the motor up nice and high and smoked them out.....heh heh

I really hope the responding agencies made available counselors for all members who worked this job. Stuff like this can just haunt you for years.

Eloquently stated John. I also find the textures and colors in the images compelling. The years, decades of paint layers on the walls and door frames inside the tenements, the faded and dirty turnout coats, the charred, bent helmets still showing the pressed design of the leather, the warped shapes of the helmet shields, and folded down/or pulled up boots all add to the beauty of these images.

For some of the younger members' edification, the Scott air pack has indeed come a long way. The 4.5 was a big improvement for the fire service. NASA got involved in creating the design. It removed the regulator (that used to be mounted on your chest with a low pressure hose connecting to the face piece on the model Don is talking about) and placed it on the newly designed facepiece. The facepiece afforded much more visability than the previous models, and this helped make it feel less claustrophobic. Positive pressure was also a new concept for the air pack. The earliest 4.5s had a problem though. Once donned and turned on, if removed there was no way of stopping the air flow short of turning off the bottle. Then they improved it again. Now if the facepiece was removed it would blow air for a few seconds at full volume, then stop automatically. The problem then became how to restart the air flow. I remember they retrofitted all the regulators with a click valve. To restart the air flow, one need to blow softly into the facepiece. This would reset the regulator. Problem was it was a delicate procedure to restart the air flow, and I remember many brothers, many times who just couldn't get the knack of the light "puff" into the facepiece to get the air flowing again. This and many other problems were solved when they finally put the button on top of the regulator to manually shut the air flow.

Here's a link to a local story about this issue from the paper here in Myrtle Beach: http://www.thesunnews.com/news/local/story...ylink=mirelated There is also an ongoing controversy about the handling of the wildfire we had that ended up jumping a six lane highway and destroying 70+ homes in North Myrtle Beach: http://www.thesunnews.com/news/local/story/1005690.html No shortage of fire department/public safety related news/problems here in South Carolina.

Correct me if I'm wrong but aren't we looking at first generation 4.5s?